Recent Cases by Staff, Law Review
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 2 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - December 1948 Article 16 
12-1948 
Recent Cases 
Law Review Staff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Law Review Staff, Recent Cases, 2 Vanderbilt Law Review 109 (1948) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol2/iss1/16 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-DOMESTIC SEPARATE
MAINTENANCE DECREE SURVIVES FOREIGN DIVORCE
After a married woman had obtained a New York decree for separate
maintenance, her husband secured a divorce a vinculo in Nevada. Service
was by publication. Thereafter, this Nevada decree was pleaded as a defense
in a New York action by the wife for arrears in maintenance installments.
The New York courts held that the Nevada divorce did not terminate the
divorced husband's liability under the separate maintenance decree. Held
(7-2),' that the full-faith-and-credit clause of the Constitution2 did not
require New York to discharge the husband from an obligation to support
his former wife. Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213 (1948).
The judicial determination of the personal liability of a husband for the
support of his wife has been held to survive the termination of the marital
status by an cx parte divorce granted by a sister state
3 or by the same state,4
though there is equally strong authority reaching the other resulL5 Similarly,
a personal liability for support not previously judicially determined has been
1. Opinion by Douglas, J.; separate dissents by Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ.
2. U. S. CONST. ART. IV, § 1. This clause directs that "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each state to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State." The Act of Congress passed pursuant to this mandate provides that the "records
and judicial proceedings" of the courts of any state "shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in
the courts of the state" from which they are taken. 1 STAT. 122 (1790), 28 U. S. C. A.
§ 687 (1928).
3. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 16 L. Ed. 226 (U. S. 1858) ; Bassett v. Bassett,
141 F. 2d 954 (C. C. A. 9th 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 718 (1944) ; Security Trust
Co. v. Woodward, 73 F. Supp. 667 (S. D. N. Y. 1947) ; Watton v. Watton, 76 Cal. App.
2d 669, 173 P. 2d 867 (1946); Ballentine v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 26 Cal.
2d 254, 158 P. 2d 14 (1945); Lednum v. Lednum, 85 Colo. 364, 276 Pac. 674 (1929) ;
Simonton v. Simonton, 40 Idaho 751, 236 Pac. 863 (1925) ; Bennett v. Tomlinson, 206
Iowa 1075, 221 N. W. 837 (1928); Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N. W. 262
(1925) ; Dorey v. Dorey, 248 Mass. 359, 142 N. E. 774 (1924) ; Kreiger v. Kreiger, 297
N. Y. 616, 75 N. E. 2d 629 (1947).
4. Wagster v. Wagster, 193 Ark. 902, 103 S. W. 2d 638 (1937) ; Robinson v. Robin-
son, 250 Ky, 488, 63 S. W. 2d 605 (1933) ; Williams v. Williams, 96 Ky. 397, 29 S. W.
132 (1895); Bowers v. Bowers, 132 N. J. Eq. 431, 28 A. 2d 515 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942);
Lentz v. Lentz, 193 N. C. 742, 138 S. E. 12 (1927) (based on state statute).'
5. The separate maintenance provision does not survive the divorce granted by a
sister state: Gullet v. Gullet, 149 F. 2d 17 (App. D. C. 1945) ; Durlacher v. Durlacher,
123 F. 2d 70 (C. C. A. 9th 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 805 (1942) ; Jones v. Jones,
31 So. 2d 314 (Ala. 1947) ; Harrison & Saunders v. Harrison, 20 Ala. 629 (1852) ; Mc-
Cullough v. McCullough, 203 Mich. 288, 168 N. W. 929 (1918). The separate maintenance
provision does not survive the divorce granted by the same state: Holmes v. Holmes, 155
F. 2d 737 (App. D. C. 1946) ; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 233 Ala. 125, 170 So. 198 (1936) ;
Vollmer v. Volher, 47 Idaho 135, 273 Pac. 1 (1929); Calkins v. Calkins, 155 Kan. 43,
122 P. 2d 750 (1942) ; cf. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26
(1938); Glaston v. Glaston, 69 Cal. App. 2d 787, 160 P. 2d 45 (1945); Metzger v.
Metzger, 32 Ohio App. 202, 167 N. E. 690 (1929).
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held by some courts to survive divorce,6 but again there is contrary author-
ity.7 Thus the husband's personal liability in some jurisdictions rests upon a
continuation of the marital status, except where provision for alimony is in-
corporated in the divorce decree or the right to undetermined alimony is
specifically reserved in the divorce decree. In other states the liability is held
to be independent of a continuation of the status. There is nothing in the
full-faith-and-credit clause of the Constitution which prohibits a state from
resting a personal or property liability, arising out of a marriage, on a basis
other than a continuation of the marital status.
The courts hold that the judicial power to determine personal liability,
as separate maintenance or alimony, requires jurisdiction in personan,
8 while
the power to dissolve the marital status is generally recognized to be vested
in either state where one of the parties maintains a bona fide domicile.
0 Insofar
as the question of interstate recognition- of divorce is involved, the Supreme
Court confirms these decisions.10
In the instant case the majority of the Court held that New York had
not denied any constitutionally guaranteed recognition of the Nevada decree.
Mr. Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that if a domestic divorce
rather than one of a sister state had been obtained, New York would have
held that the separate maintenance allowance was terminated." No cases have
been found to substantiate this interpretation of New York law. In the in-
stances where New York courts have held that their separate maintenance
6. Alimony was granted by a sister state after a divorce a vinculo: Davis v. Davis,
70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac. 241 (1921) ; Darnell v. Darnell, 212 Ill. App. 601 (1st Dist. 1918);
Searles v. Searles, 140 Minn. 385, 168 N. W. 133 (1918); Woods v. Waddle, 44 Ohio
St. 449, 8 N. E. 297 (1886) ; Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 (1869) ; Spradling v. Spradling,
74 Okla. 276, 181 Pac. 148 (1919); Nelson v. Nelson, 24 N. W. 2d 327 (S. D. 1946);
Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (1910) ; Adams v. Abbott, 21 Wash.
29, 56 Pac. 931 (1899). Alimony was granted by the same state after a divorce a vincudo:
Karcher v. Karcher, 204 Ill. App. 210 (1st Dist. 1917); Parker v. Parker, 211 Mass.
139, 97 N. E. 988 (1912); Cochran v. Cochran, 42 Neb. 612, 60 N. W. 942 '(1894)
(prior divorce based upon fraud by hpsband) ; Hutton v. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198 Pac.
165 (1921).
7. Alimony was not granted by a sister state after a divorce a vinculo: Bowman v.
Worthington, 24 Ark. 522 (1867) (holding based upon Arkansas statute); Brown v.
Brown, 24 Ga. App. 512, 101 S. E. 315 (1919) ; Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62 S. E.
182 (1908) ; Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 39 N. E. 595 (1895) ; McCoy v. McCoy,
191 Iowa 973. 183 N. W. 377 (1921) ; Shaw v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 722, 61 N. W. 368 (1894) ;
cf. Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1079 (1908). Alimony was not granted
by the same state after a divorce a vinculo: Howell v. Howell, 104 Cal. 45, 37 Pac. 770
(1894) ; I-all v. Hall, 141 Ga. 361, 80 S. E. 992 (1914); Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn. 287,
277 S. W. 894 (1925).
8. Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U. S. 279, 65 Sup. Ct. 1118, 89 L. Ed. 1608 (1945) ;
Wilkes v. Wilkes, 245 Ala. 54, 16 So. 2d 15 (1943); Proctor v. Proctor, 215 Ill. 275,
74 N. E. 145 (1905) ; Williamson v. Williamson, 183 Ky. 435, 209 S. W. 503 (1919) ;
Sheridan v. Sheridan, 213 Minn. 24, 4 N. W. 2d 785 (1942); Bray v. Landergren, 161
Va. 699, 172 S. E. 252 (1934).
9. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942) ; Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U. S.
279, 65 Sup. Ct. 1118, 89 L. Ed. 1608 (1945).
10. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942).
11. 68 Sup. Ct. at 1221.
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decrees were terminated by a divorce a vinculo, the courts granting the divorce
either had personal jurisdiction of both parties12 or the wife was the party
instituting the divorce proceeding, 13 in which case she could be held to have
lost her rights under the prior maintenance decree.
The Court's decision seems one logically following the position taken in
Williams v. North Carolina.14 It, however, raises but does not decide the
question whether discrimination 15 against judgments of sister states is neces-
sarily a denial bf full faith and credit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-USE OF PEREMPTORY
'CHALLENGE TO EXCLUDE ALL MEMBERS OF ACCUSED'S RACE
FROM TRIAL JURY
Three Negro defendants were convicted in a federal district court of
murder in the first degree. The government prosecutor had exercised 19 of
his 201 peremptory challenges so as to exclude all Negroes on the jury panel
from the jury. Two of the defendants contended that this use of the peremp-
tory challenge deprived them of the due process of law guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment. Held (2-1), that the prosecutor's action was not uncon-
stitutional. Hall v. United States, 168 F. 2d 161 (App. D. C. 1948), cert.
denied, 334 U. S. 853 (1948).
Impartiality in jury trials has always been deemed an essential element
of our democratic scheme of jurisprudence. 2 An important safeguard of that
right has been the peremptory challenge.3 It affords both the accused and
prosecution 4 the opportunity arbitrarily to exclude from the jury any other-
12. Solotoff v. Solotoff, 269 App. Div. 677, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 510 (2d Dep't 1945) ;
Richards v. Richards, 87 Misc. 134, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1028 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
13. Almquist v. Almquist, 182 Misc. 286, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Turkus v. Turkus, 180 Misc. 857, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Scheinwald v.
Scheinwald, 231 App. Div. 757, 246 N. Y. Supp. 33 (2d Dep't 1930) ; Harris v. Harris,
197 App. Div. 646, 189 N. Y. Supp. 215 (1st Dep't 1921) ; Gibson v. Gibson, 81 Misc.
508, 143 N. Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
14. 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942).
15. The discrimination, as suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, would occur if a state
by an ex parte divorce would terminate alimony previously granted by the same state
but would not recognize such termination of its alimony decrees by subsequent sister state
divorce proceedings.
1. "If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20
peremptory challenges . . ." FED. R. CRIr. P., 24(b).
2. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 66 Sup. Ct. 984, 90 L.
Ed. 1181 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 62 Sup. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed.
680 (1942) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 Sup. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940).
3. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 Sup. Ct. 350, 30 L. Ed. 578 (1887).
4. "[I]mpartiality requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused,
but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the
scales are to be evenly held .... The public prosecutor may have the strongest reasons
"to distrust the character of a juror offered, from his habits and associations, and yet
find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection to him. In such cases the
peremptory challenge is a protection against his being accepted." Hayes v. Missouri,
120 U. S. 68, 70, 7 Sup. Ct. 350, 30 L. Ed. 578 (1887).
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wise qualified juror for suspected prejudice, even though there may not be
sufficient cause to sustain a legal objection.5 The limitations on peremptory
challenges apparently exist only as to number and procedural requirements.
In 1875, Congress passed a statute prohibiting discrimination on racial
grounds in state and federal courts in the'selection of jury lists and panels.0
The United States Supreme Court has held that such discrimination in state
courts is a violation of this statute 7 as well as a denial to the defendant of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.8
The same protection is required in federal courts under the due process
dlause of the Fifth Amendment.9
It is pointed out in the principal case that the proh'ibition against racial
discrimination in the selection of the jury panel has no application to the use
of the peremptory challenge against members of the panel who have already
been properly qualified and selected.10 The peremptory challenge is a device
for' rejecting, not selecting, jurors." The accused has no right to demand
that the jury be composed, wholly or partially, of members of his own race.12
If an impartial jury remains after all challenges have been made, the require-
ments of due process have been fulfilled.13
In view of the long accepted definition and usage of the peremptory
challenge, it is difficult to see how any use of it within the prescribed statu-
tory limits could be regarded as a violation of the prohibition against racial
5. The peremptory challenge "is exercised upon qualified jurors as matter of favor
to the challenger." O'Neil v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 67 Mich. 560, 35 N. W. 162,
163 (1887); Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 14 Sup. Ct. 410, 38 L. Ed. 208
(1894); Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 13 Sup. Ct. 136, 36 L. Ed. 1011 (1892) ;
United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480, 6 L. Ed. 700 (U. S. 1827); Whitney v.
State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 197, 63 S. W. 879 (1901); 4 BL. Coim. *353.
6. "No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be. prescribed
by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of tile
United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.... ." 18 STAT. 336 (1875), 8 U. S. C. A. § 44 (1942).
7. Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 62 Sup. Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed. 1559 (1942).
8. See, e.g., Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 92 L. Ed. 164
(1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 55 Sup. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935);
Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 20 Sup. Ct. 687, 44 L. Ed. 839 (1900); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664 (1879).
9. Wong Yim v. United States, 118 F. 2d 667 (C. C. A. 9th 1941), cert. denied,
313 U. S. 589 (1941); United States v. Local 36 of International Fishermen & Allied
Workers, 70 F. Supp. 782 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
10. 168 F. 2d at 164. Cf. People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N. W. 2d
466 (1943), cert. -denied, 323 U. S. 749 (1944).
11. "The right of peremptory challenge is not of itself a right to select, but a
right to reject jurors .... It enables the prisoner to say who shall not try him; but
not to say who shall be the particular jurors to try him." United States v. Marchant,
12 Wheat. 480, 482, 6 L. Ed. 700 (U. S. 1827); People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575,
12 N. W. 2d 466 (1943), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 749 (1944) ; Note, 21 NED. L. Rv.
174 (1942).
12. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 65 Sup. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945);
United States ex rel. Jackson v. Brady, 47 F. Supp. 362 (D. C. Md. 1942), aff'd
133 F. 2d 476 (C. C. A. 4th 1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 746 (1043).
13. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 Sup. Ct. 350, 30 L. Ed. 578 (1887) ; Sliettel
v. United States, 113 F. 2d 34 (App. D. C. 1940); United States v. Parker, 103 F.
2d 857 (C. C. A. 3d 1939), cert. denied, 307 U. S. 642 (1939).
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discrimination. But the question remains whether the peremptory challenge
may not possibly be so abused as to amount to a violation of the constitutional
and statutory protection against systematic exclusion from jury service. The
view has been expressed that the concept of impartiality includes protection
against systematic exclusion from the jury of qualified representatives of
minority racial groups on account of race.14 The fact that the accused is not
prejudiced because his race is not represented on the jury may not necessarily
mean that the prosecution has the right to exclude members of that race
solely because of their race. 15 There is merit in the argument that the reasons
and policies back of the law againsf exclusion from the panel on account of
race can be nullified if those who get on the panel may be systematically
excluded from the jury.
16
The problem is difficult. To hold, on the one hand, that the privilege of
peremptory challenge should be restricted as to manner of its use would seem
to deprive it of its meaning and purpose. It would amount to a contradiction
in terms; for by definition, no cause need be shown for its exercise, and the
court is bound to abide by it. Furthermore, the practical difficulties that
would be involved in administering any constitutional limitations on the exer-
cise of the peremptory challenge are readily apparent. On the other hand,
there is always the possibility, in cases where a member of a minority group
or class is on trial, of use of the peremptory challenge so as systematically to
exclude members of that group or class from the jury. Query: Would the
United States Supreme Court continue its policy of non-interference if faced
with frequent recurrence of such use of the peremptory challenge as was
followed in the instant case, particularly in the federal courts? 17
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-USE OF AMPLIFI-
CATION DEVICE IN PUBLIC PARK HELD WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE
A municipal ordinance prohibited the use of sound amplification equip-
ment without the permission of the Chief of Police. A member of Jehovah's
14. Edgerton, J., dissenting in the instant case, 168 F. 2d at 165-66; 48 COL.
L. REV. 953 (1948).
15. "But reversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an indi-
vidual case. The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in
the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of jury selection. . . . The
injury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury to the jury system, to the law
as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in
the processes of our courts." Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195, 67 Sup. Ct.
261, 91 L. Ed. 181 (1946).
16. Edgerton, J., dissenting in the instant case, 168 F. 2d at 166; 48 COL. L.
REv. 953 (1948).
17. "Over federal proceedings we may exert a supervisory power with greater
freedom to reflect our notions of good policy than we may constitutionally exert over
proceedings in state courts." Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 287, 67 Sup. Ct. 1613,
91 L. Ed. 2043 (1947).
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Witnesses was refused renewal of his permit due to numerous complaints of
excessive noise. Continuing to use a loudspeaker in the small city park,
defendant was arrested and convicted in police court. Upon affirmation in
the state appellate courts, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States contending that his right of free speech had been violated.
Held (5-4),' that the ordinance violated the Constitution as a previous re-
straint of free speech by not prescribing standards for exercise of licensing
power and discretion. Saia v. New York, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1948).
It is a well established principle of constitutional law that free speech is
included among the "fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected
... from impairment by the States" 2 by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, but it is also well established that freedom of speech
is not absolute. Such freedom may be restricted in time of war,3 in the
presence of clear and present danger,4 and for the comfort and convenience
of the general public.5 Although reasonable regulation has been allowed
along these lines, the Supreme Court has scrutinized closely the regulatory
statutes, insisting that freedom of speech not be abridged or denied in "the
guise of regulation," 6 by a statute that could be made "the instrument of
arbitrary suppression of free expression." 7 In Thomas v. Collins,8 after
emphasizing the necessity of showing unusual situations where basic public
interests were involved before any justification for restriction of free speech
1. Majority Opinion by Douglas, J.; Frankfurter, J., dissenting (Burton & Reed,
J. J., concurring); Jackson, J., dissenting in Separate Opinion.
2. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925).
See also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949
(1938) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364, 57 Sup. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937)
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368, 51 Sup. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931)
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 372, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927);
Armstrong, The Headstone of the Corner: The Federal Bill of Rights, 13 Miss. L. J. 187
(1941); Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH. U. L. Q. 497
(1942); Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L.
REv. 431 (1926).
3. For strict applicatior of the Federal Espionage Act of 1917, see Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U. S. 466, 40 Sup. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 360 (1920) ; Abrams v. United
States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173 (1919). But World War II saw
the Espionage Act more liberally construed in Hartzel v. United States, 322 U. S. 680,
64 Sup. Ct. 1233, 88 L. Ed. 1534 (1944). For full discussion, see CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATEs 36-140 (1946).
4. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945) ; Bridges
v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927) ; Schenck v. United States,
249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919). See Notes, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 120
(1947), 26 NEB. L. REv. 416 (1947); 61 HARV. L. Rzv. 537 (1948).
5. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 61 Sup. Ct. 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 (1941);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940);
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155 (1939);
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L.
Ed. 1423 (1939).
6. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 516, 59 Sup. Ct.
954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939), 14 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 157, 13 So. CALIF. L. REV. 127.
7. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 516, 59 Sup. Ct.
954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939).
8. 323 U. S. 516, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945), 33 CALIF. L. REv. 317.
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would be allowed, the Court said: "Only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." 9 The fact
that abuses of an arbitrary licensing ordinance are subject to judicial revieNN
does not validate previous restraint.10 Restrictive statutes must be "narrowly
drawn" "1 and contain standards to guide licensing officials.' 2 Where a
statute is silent as to such standards, it is said to give unlimited arbitrary
discretion and is held unconstitutional.'
3
The holding in the instant case indicates that freedom to speak with the
aid of amplification devices comes within the wide protection afforded free-
dom of speech by the Constitution. Confronted with this novel situation,
the Court felt compelled to protect amplified speech as it had protected the
other basic liberties. 14 Had the ordinance involved in the principal case
authorized the chief of police to promulgate his own reasonable rules under
which permits would be issued, and had he acted under previously prepared
and published regulations, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it would have
been upheld.15 The decision in this case is probably not as important as it
would appear at first blush. True, it enlarges the protected scope of free
speech, but it also permits regulation. The protection here given to this modern
technological phase of free speech probably will not approach the nearly com-
plete immunity allowed normal speech and writing,16 but the language of the
Court suggests that complete statutory prohibition of sound equipment might
be looked upon with disfavor.17 Analytically, the problem presented here
9. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945).
10. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213
(1940), referred to in principal case at p. 1149.
11. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213
(1940), 40 COL. L. REv. 1067, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 515 (1941).
12. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940);
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L.
Ed. 1423 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938).
13. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) ;
cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S..569, 61 Sup. Ct 762, 85 L. Ed. 1049 (1941).
21 B. U. L. REv. 540 (1941) discusses the Cox decision approvingly, but the discussion
of the case in 9 DUKE B. A. J. 151 (1941) looks upon it as an example of judicial legis-
lation.
14. "Unless we are to retreat from the firm positions we have taken in the past, we
must give freedom of speech in this case the same preferred treatment that we gave
freedom of religion ... freedom of the press .. . and freedom of speech and assembly."
68 Sup. Ct. at 1150. The majority opinion does not accent the fact that appellant is a
member of Jehovah's Witnesses; but it alludes to a line of cases involving that sect. For
discussions of the influence this sect has had on constitutional law, see Barber, Religious
Liberty v. Police Power, 41 Am. POL. Scr. REv. 226 (1947) ; Cushman, Civil Liberties,
42 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 42 (1948,); Howerton, Jehovah's Witnesses and the Federal
Constitution, 17 Miss. L. J. 347 (1946) ; Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 77 (1948).
15. The Court, in applying the Federal Constitution, is not here concerned with the
problem of separation of powers, but leaves that problem for the state courts. It speaks
of "uncontrolled discretion" exercised by the licensing official. 68 Sup. Ct. at 1150. If the
legislative body, either municipal or state, had provided a general structure of standards
or conditions to be complied with, the discretion probably would not be said to be"uncontrolled."
16. "Noise can be regulated by regulating decibels. The hours and place of public
discussion can be controlled." 68 Sup. Ct. at 1150.
17. "Loud-speakers are today indispensable instruments of effective public speech....
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is one to be met by the legislative draftsman. Carefully worded statutes
allowing reasonable restrictions based on announced general standards will
protect both the precious right of privacy and the equally precious right
of free speech.' 8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-EVIDENCE OB-
TAINED WITHOUT SEARCH WARRANT INADMISSIBLE THOUGH SEIZED
IN PROCESS OF LAWFUL ARREST
A federaf agent, in disguise, was employed by petitioners to help build
a barn, erect a still and to work as a mashman. He kept his superiors informed
by radio as to petitioners' illegal activities. After several weeks of operation,
a raid was planned and executed on the barn, with permission of the owner-
lessor. One of the petitioners was observed through an open door of the barn
operating the still and was arrested in the act. Thereupon the illicit distillery
and products at hand were seized. The other petitioners were arrested shortly
thereafter. The agents had neither arrest nor search warrants. From denial of
a motion to order the return of the seized property and to exclude and sup-
press its use as evidence against them on the ground that it had been obtained
illegally, petitioners bring certiorari. Held (5-4),' that the arrest of the peti-
tioner discovered at the distillery was legal, but the seizure was unreasonable
and therefore illegal, and the order denying.petitioners' motion to suppress
the use of the property so seized as evidence is reversed. Trupiano v. United
States, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1948).
This case raises again 2 the troublesome problem of what is included in
It [the sound truck] is the way people are reached." 68 Sup. Ct. at 1150. See state courts
that have upheld ordinances outlawing the use of sound equipment. Kovacs v. Cooper,
135 N. J. L. 64, 50 A. 2d 451 (1946) ; Hamilton v. City of Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 124
P. 2d 757 (1942). But see Brachey v. Maupin, 277 Ky. 467, 126 S. W. 2d 881, 887 (1939).
18. An editorial in 34 A. B. A. J. 589 (1948) views with rather unfounded alarm
the decision in the principal case and predicts a trying period to be endured while legis-
lative bodies attempt to cope with this new task of revamping their regulatory statutes.
1. Opinion by Murphy, J.; dissent by Vinson, C. J., (Black, Reed and Burton,
JJ., concurring).
2. For a period of approximately a century, articles taken by unreasonable searches
and seizures were admissible in evidence in federal courts against the accused, leaving
the party whose constitutional right had thereby been invaded to seek his remedy in an
action of trespass against the person making the illegal search and seizure. In so holding
the courts adopted the English rule that the unlawful manner in which evidence is
procured is not a valid objection to its being admitted as evidence. See, e.g., Calcraft v.
Guest, [1898] 1 Q. B. 759; Lloyd v. Mostyn, 10 M. & W. 478, 152 Eng. Rep. 55&
(Ex. 1842). The Fourth Amendment does not expressly prohibit such evidence, and
it was not until 1886, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L.
Ed. 46, that the Supreme Court indicated that such was the intended meaning of that
Amendment. The Court considered the Fourth Amendment together with the Fifth
("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
. ."), and saw an interaction making the admission of such evidence have the
effect of compelling a person to be a witness against himself. See Corwin, The
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Micn. L. Rnv.
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the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures," 3 as used in the Fourth
Amendment 4 and what effect violation of the secured right has. The Court
has construed the Amendment to imply that ordinarily searches conducted
without authority of a search warrant are unreasonable, 5 and that in seizing
goods and articles law enforcement officers must secure and use search war-
rants wherever reasonably practicable.6 There has been, however, a most im-
portant exception to these" rules-the right of search and seizure as incident
to a lawful arrest. A long line of cases affirms the principle that an arresting
officer may look around at the time of the arrest and seize fruits and evidence
of the crime within his immediate and discernible presence 1-and may, in
fact, search for such articles.8 Reasons for this exception are that it may be
necessary to foil the escape of the criminal or to prevent the removal or de-
struction of evidence, or for other reasons it may be impracticable to obtain a
search warrant.9
1, 191 (1930). The Court in 1904, Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup.
Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575, repudiated conclusion in the Boyd case basing its opinion on
authority upholding the common-law rule; but Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383,
34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914), saw the Court establish the present-day federal
rule whereby the accused may petition seasonably for suppression and restoration of the
wrongfully acquired evidence. E.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 52 Sup.
Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1932). Wingren, A Short Review of the Law on Searches and
Seizures and the Motion to Suppress the Evidence, 18 RocKY Mr. L. REv. 345 (1946).
3. On the law of searches and seizures generally, see CORNELIUS, SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES (2d ed. 1926); DAX, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. (1926); Arnold, Search and
Seizure Problems, 16 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1940); Fairchild, Freedom from Unreasonable
Search and Seizure, 25 MARQ. L. REv. 13 (1940); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1921) ; Hendrix, Recent United States Supreme Court
Interpretations of the Law of Searches and Seizures, 37 J. CEi. L. & CRIMIINOLOGY 413
(1947); Waite, Reasonable Search and Research, 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 623 (1938);
Wingren, supra note 2.
4. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized." U. S. CoNSr.
AMEND. IV. For a study of the Fourth Amendment in its historical setting, see, LA SSON,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUrION (55 Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,
1937). Similar or identical provisions to the United States constitutional provision in
Amendment IV are contained in the constitutions of each of the forty-eight states.
CORNELIUS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 2 n. 13 (2d ed. 1926).
5. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
6. Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14, 15, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 323
(1948); Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1, 6, 52 Sup. Ct. 466, 76 L. Ed. 951 (1932);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358, 51 Sup. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed.
374 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed.
543 (1925). The basis for such requirement is the desirability of having judicial officers,
rather than police officers, determine when searches and seizures are permissible and what
limitations should be placed upon such activities. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S.
452, 464, 52 Sup. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1932). For a historical survey of United States
statutes authorizing the issuance of search warrants, see appendix to Davis v. United
States, 328 U. S. 582, 603, 604, 66 Sup. Ct. 1256, 90 L. Ed. 1453 (1946).
7. These cases are cited in the opinion in the principal case. 68 Sup. Ct. at 1232.
8. E.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399
(1947) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 68 Sup. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 323 (1948);
Peru v. United States, 4 F. 2d 881 (C. C. A. 8th 1925). If arrest is not lawful, then
any search following as an incident thereto is unlawful.
9. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).
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In the instant case, all the Justices agreed that the arrest without a war-
rant was lawful, even though there had been an opportunity to obtain one,
inasmuch as the arrestee was committing a felony 10 in the discernible presence
of the arresting officer." The point on which they were not able to agree, how-
ever, was whether the exception permitting a seizure incidental to a lawful
arrest should apply to the fact situation at hand. The majority declared that
the "mere fact that there was a valid arrest does not ipso facto legalize a
search or seizure without a warrant" 12 and added that there must be other
factors making it unreasonable or impracticable to require the arresting officer
to secure a warrant before seizure. They did not find such factors present
here. In view of the circumstances that the planted agent could secure all the
details necessary for making out the search warrant weeks ahead of the raid,
and that "the property was not of a type that could have been dismantled and
removed before the agents had time to secure a warrant ... especially 13 ...
since one of them was on hand at all times to report and guard against such
a move," 14 the majority held that the seizure under these circumstances was
unreasonable.'
5
The Court is confronted with the need of weighing two conflicting poli-
cies. On the one side is the policy for preservation of the constitutional guaran-
ties of individual civil'rights, including the right to be secure from unreason-
able searches and seizures; and, on the other, the public interest in effective
10. Petitioner's acts were in violation of INT. Rav. CODE §§ 2803, 2810, 2812, 2814,
2831, 2833.
11. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156, 157, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed.
543 (1925) ; Elk v. United States, 177 U. S. 529, 20 Sup. Ct. 729, 44 L. Ed. 874 (1900) ;
Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 498, 499, 6 Sup. Ct. 148, 29 L. Ed. 458 (1885). United
States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. Cal. 1943), discusses the law of arrest. See
Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. Rav. 201 (1940), for a treatment of the general
field of arrest and incidents thereto. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Micu. L.
REv. 541, 673 (1924), deals more specifically with the problem here involved.
12. 68 Sup. Ct. at 1234, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158, 45 Sup.
Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).
13. Might a later court take this language to imply that this court would have
held this seizure to be unreasonable even if the property were of a portable character,
an agent being on hand to guard against the moving? See United States v. Kaplan,
89 F. 2d 869, 871 (C. C. A. 2d 1937). The case cited, however, seems to lend little
support to the text because (1) it did not involve a search and seizure incidental to an
arrest, and because (2) the search and seizure were held to be valid.
14. 68 Sup. Ct. at 1233.
15. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, dissenting, said, "Federal officers, following a lawful
arrest, seized contraband materials which were being employed in open view in violation
and defiance of the laws of the land. Today, the Court for the first time has branded
such a seizure illegal. Nothing in the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment
dictates that result. Nor is that holding supported by any decision of this Court ...
The Court would now condition this right of seizure after a valid arrest upon an ex
post facto judicial judgment of whether the arresting officers might have obtained a
search warrant. At best, the operation of the rule which the Court today enunciates
for the first time may be expected to confound confusion in a field already replete with
complexities." 68 Sup. Ct. at 1235, 1238. Compare Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S.
1, 52 Sup. Ct. 466, 76 L. Ed. 951 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U. S. 344, 51 Sup. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U. S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1932), and cases there cited.
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,criminal law enforcement in order to maintain a peaceful and orderly society
and government. 16 The differing opinions of judges on the relative importance
of these two policies accounts for seemingly inconsistent results in some cases,
and for the vigorous dissents in many of them.'
7
The case of Harris v. United States' s considerably broadened the scope
of the search an arresting officer may make without a search warrant in certain
situations as incident to a lawful arrest. Now, a few months later, those who
dissented in that case are in the majority in the instant case and find new
grounds on which to hold a seizure unreasonable. The case marks the first
instance when ample time in which to get a search warrant has been used as the
principal reason for holding a seizure incidental to a lawful arrest to be
illegal.' 9 Never before had a seizure by federal officers of contraband articles
being used by the arrestee at the time and place of lawful arrest in violation
of the laws of the land, been held to be illegal. The Court also hints that it
may limit or overrule the Harris case, if the question involved there comes
before it again.
20
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT AS STATE ACTION
Petitioners, Negroes, purchased a parcel of land, the occupancy and
ownership of which was limited by a racially restrictive agreement to persons
of the Caucasian race. Respondents, owners of other property subject to the
terms of the agreement, instituted suit in equity to have the petitioners re-
16. "On the one side is the social need that crime be repressed. On the other, the
social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office." Cardozo, J., in
People v: Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585, 589 (1925).
17. As a solution, many would have the court rectify its "historical blunder"--the
Weeks case, in which they established the exclusionary rule-and return to the English
rule. (See note 2 supra). Criticism of the exclusionary rule: 8 WiGMloRE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2183, 2184, 2184a (3d ed. 1940); CORNELIUS, LAW OF SF.ARC AND SEIZURE § 7
(2d ed. 1926) ; Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19 ILL. L. REV.
303 (1925); ef. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930). Others, however, assert that without the
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment would be an empty collection of words,
quoting Justice Holmes in one of his famous dissents, "We have to choose, and for my
part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government
should play an ignoble part." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 470, 48 Sup.
Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928). For a strong criticism of this statement by Holmes,
see Waite, Reasonable Search and Seizure, 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 623 (1938). And some
even warn of the possibility of political persecution without the rule. See, e.g., Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 (C. C. A. 2d 1926).
18. 331 U. S. 145, 67 Sub. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947); Note, 1 VANDERBILT
L. REv. 60 (1947).
19. There being ample time in which to procure an arrest warrant, would the court
ever go so far as to hold such an arrest as here made illegal? It seems highly im-
probable that it would, but before this case no one supposed that a seizure of contra-
band articles in plain sight of the arresting officer, incidental to a lawful arrest, would be
held to be illegal just because ample time was available beforehand in which to get a
search warrant.
20. 68 Sup. Ct. at 1234.
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strained from taking possession of the land in question. The Supreme Court
of Missouri upheld the validity of the restrictive covenant, and directed its
enforcement.' Held, that although such agreements based solely on race or
color are not illegal and may be voluntarily adhered to, court enforcement of
them is state action and a denial of the equal protection of the laws as guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Shelley v.
Kraemer, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948).2
Prior to the instant case, restrictive agreements8 directed toward the ex-
clusion of persons of a designated race4 from using or owning property in a
particular area were attacked primarily on the theory that they were either
(1) inhibited by the Fourteenth Amendment,5 (2) contrary to public policy,6
or (3) an improper restraint on the alienation of land3 These attacks on race
covenants have been largely unsuccessful, the rationale pertaining to the con-
1. Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S. W. 2d 679 (1946).
2. McGhee v. Sipes, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948), which arose in Michigan, was decided
with the instant case, since a similar fact situation and the same constitutional questions
were involved.
3. As to the general nature of restrictive agreements, see Stone v. Jones, 66 Cal.
App. 2d 264, 152 P. 2d 19, 22 (1944); Note, 33 CORN. L. Q. 293 n. 9 (1947); Note,
162 A. L. R. 180 (1946). "The restrictions may be created by reservation in the cpn-
veyance, or by a condition annexed to the grant, or by a covenant, or they may be
independent of any conveyance of land, being merely by agreement between adjoining
landowners as regards the use of their land." 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 473-4 (3d ed.,
Jones, 1939). Note, 14 VA. L. REv. 646 (1928), makes a distinction between restrictive
covenants and covenants running with the land.
4. The agreement in the instant case provided that "it being intended hereby to
restrict the use of said property for said period of time against the occupancy as owners
or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other purpose by people of the
Negro or Mongolian Race." 68 Sup. Ct. at 838. The Negro race is not the only race
against which discrimination is directed. See 68 Sup. Ct. at 846 n. 26; McGovney, The
Anti-Iapanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CALIF. L. REV.
7 (1947).
5. These covenants, including restrictions both as to transfer and occupancy, have
uniformly been held not unconstitutional. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary,.181 Cal.
680, 186 Pac. 596, 9 A. L. R. 115 (1919); Steward v. Cronan, 105 Colo. 393, 98
P. 2d 999 (1940) ; Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S. E. 2d 522
(1945) ; Lion's Head Lake v. Brzezinski, 23 N. J. Misc. 290, 43 A. 2d 729 (Dist. Ct.
1945) ; Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okla. 567, 133 P. 2d 555 (1942).
6. Allegations that racial restrictions are opposed to public policy have been in-
effective. Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869 (App. D. C. 1945); Porter v. Johnson, 232
Mo. App. 1150, 115 S. W. 2d 529 (1938). A Canadian case has, however, declared race
covenants to be invalid as opposed to public policy. 59 HARV. L. REV. 803 (1946).
Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 847,
853 (1948). "Equity is rooted in conscience. In good conscience it cannot be 'the exer-
cise of a sound judicial discretion' by a federal court" to uphold a race covenant when
such authorization violates basic rights secured against state action by the Constitution.
7. It is usually conceded that racial restrictions on use or occupancy do not impose
improper restraints on the alienation of land. Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295, 196
Atl. 330 (1938); Notes, 57 YALE L. J. 426, 447-48 (1948), 162 A. L. R. 180, 181
(1946). There is, however, a decided split of authority as to whether a restriction on
transfer of title is an improper restraint. For a collection of cases in conflict on this
point, see Notes, 162 A. L. R. 180 (1946), 114 A. L. R. 1237 (1938), 66 A. L. R. 531
(1930), 9 A. L. R. 120 (1920).
Other grounds upon which racially restrictive covenants have been resisted with
varying success include failure to record, insufficient number of signatures to the agree-
ment, change in character of occupancy in the neighborhood subsequent to the agree-
ment, and repugnancy to the grant of a fee simple estate. Note, 13 U. OF Cnr. L. REv.
477, 479 n. 9 (1946) ; Note, 162 A. L. R. 180 (1946).
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stitutional question being that the enforcement-of private contracts does not
constitute state action. On the other hand, state statutes and local ordinances
purporting to achieve the same typd of exclusion have been declared uncon-
stitutional by the United States Supreme Court, the rationale being that a
pattern of racial discrimination limiting the occupancy, purchase, and sale of
property set forth by state or municipal legislation is "in direct violation of
the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due
process of law." 8 But in the present case where no legislation was involved,
the particular pattern of discrimination was determined by the terms of a
private agreement,* and the participation by the state consisted only of en-
forcement of that agreement. This distinction was rejected by the Court in
rendering the first decision 9 to the effect that state court enforcement of a
racially restrictive agreement is unconstitutional, discriminatory state action.10
Although voluntary adherence to the terms of a racially restrictive cove-
nant does not violate any rights guaranteed by the Constitution,". under the
holding of the instant case that it becomes an agreement to which the law
apparently attaches no legal or equitable obligations, the covenant loses its
effectiveness; for it "is perfectly true that the covenants take life from court
enforcement and that without it the discrimination they implement would
wholly fail." 12
It is probable that continuing consideration will be given to certain
8. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 82, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1917).
See also Harman v. Tyler, 273 U. S. 668, 47 Sup. Ct. 471, 71 L. Ed. 831 (1927). For
various state declarations as to invalidity of similar statutes, see 68 Sup. Ct. at 842 n. 11.
9. 68 Sup. Ct. at 839. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 46 Sup. Ct. 521, 70
L. Ed. 969 (1926), held that racially restrictive agreements as such were not uncon-
stitutional; the question as to validity of judicial enforcement of these agreements was
not before the court. See also Note, 45 MicH. L. Rav. 733, 738 (1947).
10. In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 680, 50 Sup.
Ct. 451, 74 L. Ed. 1107 (1930), the Court held that "The federal guaranty of due process
extends to state action through its judicial as well as through its legislative, executive
or administrative branch of government." See also Raymond v. Chicago' Union Trac-
tion Co., 207 U. S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, 52 L. Ed. 78 (1907) ; McGovney, Racial Residen-
tial Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or
Conditions in Deeds Is Unconstitutional, 33 CALIF. L. Rav. 5 (1945).
11. 68 Sup. Ct. at 842. See also Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo v. Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct.
847, 851 (1948), cases in the District of Columbia, in which REV. STAT. § 1978 (1875),
8 U. S. C. A. § 42 (1946), was held to invalidate judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants, but not voluntary adherence to their terms.
12. Note, 45 MIcEr. L. REv. 733, 741 (1947). "Race restrictive covenants are not
self-enforcing but require court aid to force the recalcitrant owner to keep his original
pledge not to sell to Negroes. If it can be established that it is illegal for courts to
affirmatively support these covenants, or if these agreements are unenforceable on any,
other grounds, race covenants will lose their effectiveness as a means of restricting
Negroes to their overcrowded Harlems." Note, 33 CoRN. L. Q. 293, 294 (1947). "In
the restrictive covenant cases, the 'private' discrimination is ineffectual, in every con-
tested case; until the judicial agency of the government implements it by injunction."
Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants: A Reconsideration of the
Problem, 12 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 198, 212 (1945).
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devices in the future in an effort to attain the result previously accomplished
by race covenants. Possible methods13 might include:
(1) The creation of estates on special limitation. 14 Original deeds to
each parcel conveyed would create this type of estate by the use of words
providing that the estate is to last only so long as no transfer or lease is made
to persons of a specified race. The special limitation subjects the remote
grantee t6 the same liability to termination of the estate as sustained by the
original grantee. 15 In the event of a transfer or lease of the land to persons
of this race, title would immediately revest in the grantor.16 Under the instant
case, however, would not court enforcement of the grantor's right to pos-
session in an action of ejectment against the grantee be considered as un-
lawful state action in the same category with judicial enforcement of race
covenants? Would self-help be available? 17
(2) The use of penalty bonds.' 8 Here the grantor might require a
penalty bond from each grantee to secure performance of the condition that
the land would not be transferred or leased to persons of a particular race.
However, the bond would merely force the original grantee to pay the penalty
and would be ineffective in preventing either the original or a remote grantee
from conveying the land to persons of any race. And the enforcement of the
penalty against the original grantee might be invalidated for deprivation of a
property right by the state without due process of law.
(3) The use of personal deposits. 19 The grantor might obtain a personal
money deposit from each grantee to be forfeited in case of transfer or lease
13. In each of the methods considered it may be assumed that the grantor is a
corporation owning a tract of land to be redeveloped into a residential subdivision. This
assumption is made not as a requirement for success of any particular method, but
merely to present a stronger case and to eliminate some incidental problems which
would otherwise be created.
14. The estate on special limitation is afh interest in land which terminates auto-
matically upon the occurrence of a specified event. See Brown v. Hobbs, 132 Md. 559,
104 Atl. 283, 285 (1918) ; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 217 (3d ed., Jones, 1939). This
estate may be created by the use of appropriate words in the deed of conveyance; e.g.,"'until' a certain event takes place, or 'while' or 'so long as' an existing state of things
shall endure." Id. § 218. In other words, the grantee or devisee of a parcel of land
retains his interest therein only for so long as a specified event does not take place.
15. Riner v. Fallis, 176 Ky. 575, 195 S. IV. 1102 (1917); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY § 220 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
16. In creating such a limitation, other than a constitutional question, there is a
problem of its being an improper restraint on alienation. Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich.
373, 206 N. W. 532 (1925) ; 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1345 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
17. For a discussion of the possibility of self-help in connection with a similar
problem, see Wade, Legal Status of Property Transferred Under an Illegal Transaction,
41 ILL. L. REV. 487, 494-95 (1946).
18. A penalty bond is a sealed instrument by which a person promises to do a certain
act or perform a certain condition, or, if in default, to pay a certain sum of money as a
penalty for non-performance. For a general discussion of penalties in bonds, see 3
WILLIsToN, CONTRAcTS §§ 774-84 (Rev. ed. 1936).
19. This situation may be analogous to the money deposit as liquidated damages to
secure the performance of an executory contract, and "If the deposit is unreasonable in
amount and the actual damage will be negligible or capable of actual measurement the




to persons considered undesirable by the grantor. This forfeiture would not
seem to involve state action in any form, but the arrangement would be im-
practical. If the original grantee conveyed the land to a person considered
desirable by the grantor, the deposit would be returned, leaving the remote
grantee free to convey to any person. It is also doubtful that persons seeking
to purchase real estate would be willing to "tie-up" any substantial sum of
money in this manner.
(4) The reservation in deeds of an option to repurchase. 20 The option,
which could be drafted without reference to race, could be exercised against
the original or remote grantee,21 the maximum period, however, during which
time it may be exercised being limited by the rule against perpetuities.22 Under
this arrangement, in theory at least, the grantor would be in a position to re-
acquire the property from any grantee without discriminating against a par-
ticular race. This theory might become important in an. action for specific
enforcement of the option23 as an argument against holding court enforcement
to be unconstitutional, discriminatory state action. But even if the constitutional
obstacle is surmounted, it is -doubtful that a prospective grantee would accept
a deed subjecting him to the possibility of a forced sale at any time within
the life of the option.
Intentional discrimination by individuals in selecting purchasers of real
estate is in no way mitigated or denied by the holding of the instant case,
24
but it is reasonable to assume that court enforcement of any device adopting
a similar policy of racial exclusion will not be upheld.
25
20. An option to repurchase is a reservation in a deed of conveyance of'a right in
the grantor to repurchase the estate created, within a specified period, from the grantee
or his successor in interest. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 394 (1944). This option to re-
purchase is an interest that falls within the common law rule against perpetuities; for the
maximum permissible period allowed under this rule, see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 374
(1944). "The fact that an absolute conveyance is accompanied by a bond to reconvey,
or by an agreement that the grantor may purchase within a given time, at the same or a
different price, is not conclusive that the transaction is a mortgage. Such a transaction
is perfectly valid and the right to repurchase is lost if not exercised within the stipulated
time." 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1397 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
21. "A, owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, makes an otherwise effective con-
veyance... 'to B and his heirs, reserving, however, to A and his heirs the privilege .. *
to repurchase ... upon repaying to B or to his successor in interest, the present purchase
price . . . and reiumbursing ... for the reasonable value of improvements .. '" RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 394, illustration 1 (1944).
22. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 394 (1944).
23. "We are of the opinion that the repurchase clause is sufficient to support a suit
for specific performance...." School Board of Roanoke v. Payne, 151 Va. 240, 144
S. E. 444, 446 (1928).
24. "That [Fourteenth] Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful." 68 Sup. Ct. at 842.
25. If these devices prove to be ineffective, it is possible that leasehold interests, as
contrasted with transfer of title to property, may be utilized more extensively by persons
desiring segregation of races. Suppose for the purpose of excluding certain races a private
corporation secures a large tract of land, builds dwelling units thereon, and leases them
to persons of the corporation's own choice, With each lease containing a provision
against sub-lease. Is this any more than such private discrimination that falls outside
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment? See Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N. Y. 320, 52
N. E. 2d-884 (1943) ; Note, 57 YALE L. J. 426, 437-44 (1948) (Stuyvesant Town project).
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CONTRACTS-BROKER'S COMMISSIONS-RIGHT TO RECOVER UNDER
DOCTRINE OF SUBSTITUTED PERFORMANCE
Plaintiff's assignor, a brolker, procured a one-year charter party for de-
fendant, the owner of a vessel. Defendant agreed by separate contract to pay
the broker his commission on the monthly hire earned under the charter. The
charterer subchartered the vessel at once for the year at an increased rate.
After six months the charterer had partially defaulted in payment of hire,
and defendant threatened to withdraw the vessel. The charterer at this time
assigned to defendant the subcharter, guaranteeing full performance. Plaintiff
claims brokerage commissions on the last six-months hire received by de-
fendant under the subcharter. Held (4-1), for plaintiff. Defendant accepted
a substituted performance, which allowed the defendant completely to realize
all benefits due under the original charter. Kane v. Neptune Shipping, Ltd.,
274 App. Div. 28, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 396 (1st Dep't 1948).
A contract between a broker and his principal which provides that the
broker's commission will be paid upon receipt of the purchase money is held
by the majority of the courts to come within well recognized principles of
contract law.1 It is a legal maxim that a condition precedent precludes the
promisor's liability unless the condition is performed or excused. 2 The condi-
tion is excused if the promisor accepts a modified performance or intentionally
prevents the condition from taking place. 3 The leading case of Haber v.
Goldberg4 represents a line of decisions in which some courts have not ad-
hered to these principles. In this case the vendee defaulted and the principal
recovered legal damages, which, the court said, did not entitle the principal
to repudiate his undertaking; and the broker was allowed recovery. The condi-
tion that the purchase money be received, however, was not performed or
excused. Some courts have allowed the broker to recover tinder similar cir-
cumstances when the principal had obtained a decree for specific perform-
ance; 5 when he had received compensation in a compromise agreement; 6 or
even when he had received no compensation or damages but had a cause of
action against a solvent vendee but had not prosecuted his claim.7 A few courts
1. Daly v. Chapman Mfg. Co., 246 Mass. 118, 140 N. E. 677 (1923) ; Leschziner v.
Bauman, 83 N. J. L. 743, 85 Atl. 205 (1912); Hinds v. Henry, 36 N. J. L. 328 (Sup.
Ct. 1873); B. W. Lougheed & Co., Ltd., v. Yone Suzuki, 216 App. Div. 487, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 505 (1st Dep't 1926).
2. WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 676 (Rev. ed. 1938).
3. Ibid. (seven grounds listed, not all particularly applicable in this situation).
4. 92 N. J. L. 367, 105 Atl. 874 (1918).
5. In the instant case, 79 N. Y. S. 2d at 399, this is stated as the holding of the
memorandum decision in Hirschfeld v. Jamaica Savings Bank, 257 App. Div. 991,
13 N. Y. S. 2d 643 (2d Dep't 1939).
6. Kendrick v. Speck, 67 F. 2d 295 (C. C. A. 4th 1933); Dermody v. New
Jersey Realties, 101 N. J. L. 334, 128 Atl. 265 (1925).
7. Chambers v. Estes, 159 Ark. 250, 251 S. W. 701 (1923) ; Tarbell v. Bomes, 48
R. I. 86, 135 Atl. 604 (1927). Contra: Amies v. Wesnofske, 255 N. Y. 156, 174 N. E.
436 (1931). Note, 31 COL. L. RFv. 701 ,(1931).
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have imposed a duty on the part of the principal to enforce his legal right,8
but this view has generally been rejected.9
An attempt was made in the instant case to reconcile the decisions in
line with the Haber case with decisions holding that the broker could not
recover under seemingly similar circumstances. it was pointed out that in
the cases where the broker was not allowed recovery, the principal had suf-
fered a net loss notwithstanding the fact that he had accepted compensation
in a compromise agreemeht; whereas in the cases holding the broker could
recover, the principal had been made whole by having accepted a "substituted
performance." The distinction is not borne out by the cases cited. The basis of
the decisions denying the broker a right to his commission was that the con-
dition precedent, not having been excused or performed, precluded the princi-
pal's liability. 10 However, the court in Dermody v. New Jersey Realties,"
allowing the broker to recover the commission, based its decision on the fact
that the principal had received damages in effecting a compromise on a con-
tract procured by the broker. The question of whether or not the principal had
been made whole was not discussed.
The doctrine of "substituted performance" is basically equitable, and
the qualification added by this court-i.e., the principal must be made whole-
is itself equitable. As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, to attempt to
reconcile these principles with the cases adhering strictly to legal principles
is to invite confusion. In adopting the doctrine of "substituted perforrhance,"
it is submitted that the majority should have clearly pointed out that the basis
of the decision was equitable, not legal.
CONTRACTS-COMMERCIAL FRUSTRATION-REQUIREMENT THAT A
BASIC PURPOSE OF THE CONTRACT BE FRUSTRATED
Plaintiff, having purchased land upon which he proposed to build a new
home, entered into a contract on February 15, 1946, to sell his old home to
defendant. A definite date for delivery of the premises was not set, as the
parties recognized that unforseen building difficulties might arise in the con-
struction of the new home and agreed that delivery would be made when the
new home was constructed to the point where plaintiff could move in. On
8. Tarbell v. Bomes, 48 R. I. 86, 135 Atl. 604 (1927) ; see Glade v. Ford, 131 Mo.
App. 164, 111 S. W. 135, 137 (1908).
9. Amies v. Wesnofske, 255 N. Y. 156, 174 N. E. 436 (1931); Cate v. Madden,
165 Tenn. 371, 55 S. W. 2d 262 (1932); Note, 31 COL. L. REv. 701 (1931).
10. Daly v. Chapman. Mfg. Co., 246 Mass. 118, 140 N. E. 677 (1923); Amies v.
Wesnofske, 255 N. Y. 156, 174 N. E. 436 (1931); B. W. Lougheed & Co. v. Yone
Suzuki, 216 App. Div. 487, 215 N. Y. Supp. 505 (lst Dep't 1926); MacDowell-Peterman
Co. v. Independent Packing Co., 211 App. -Div. 781, 208 N. Y. Supp. 341 (1st Dep't
1925).
11. 101 N. J. L. 334, 128 AtI. 265 (1925).
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May 22, 1946, The Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946 1 was passed,
and plaintiff was unable to get priority for building materials. Defendant,
waving delays, demanded performance. Plaintiff brought suit for declaratory
relief, insisting that the governmental regulations had frustrated his con-
tractual purpose and that he was entitled to rescind. Held, the doctrine of com-
mercial frustration was not applicable. Darn v. Goetz, 193 P. 2d 121 (Cal.
App. 1948).
Before the doctrine of commercial frustration 2 is deemed to apply so as
to release a promisor from his contractual obligations, the courts generally
require the presence of the following elements: (1) that the basic reason
recognized by both parties for entering into the transaction has been destroyed
by the frustrating event, (2) that this event was not reasonably foreseeable,
(3) that it was not in the power or control of the promisor, (4) that the con-
tingency was not taken care of in the contract, i.e., the promisor did not ex-
pressly assume the risk, and (5) that the strict terms of the contract are still
possible of performance.3
The doctrine of frustration is not, strictly speaking, a part of the concept
of impossibility as used in contract law, though some courts tend to confuse
the two concepts.4 The true distinction is that within the doctrine of frustration
performance is still possible, but the expected value of the performance to
the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed by the unforeseeable hap-
1. 60 STAT. 207 (1946), repealed 61 STAT. 193, 50 U. S. C. A. § 1821 (1947).
2. See generally: Kinzer Construction Co. v. State, 125 N. Y. Supp. 46 (Ct. Cl., 1910),
aff'd 204 N. Y. 381, 97 N. E. 871 (1912) (historical approach); Morgan v.
Manser, [1947] 2 All E. R. 666, 21 Aust. L. J. 472 (1948) (collection and history of Eng-
lish cases dealing -with commercial frustration) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1935, 1954
(Rev. ed. 1938) ; Buckland, Casus and Frustration in Roman and Common Law, 46 HAirV.
L. REv. 1281 (1933) ; Conlen, The Doctrine of Frustration as Applied to Contracts, 70 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 87 (1921) ; Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Inpossibility of
Performance, 18 MICH. L. REv. 589 (1920). As to the application of the doctrine of frus-
tration to leases see: Lloyd v. Murphy, 2,5 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P. 2d 47 (1944), 43 MIcu. L.
REv. 985 (1945) ; Leonard v. Autocar Sales and Service Co., 392 Ill. 182, 64 N. E. 2d
477 (1945) ; Frazier v. Collins, 300 Ky. 18, 187 S. W. 2d 816 (1945) ; Raner v. Goldberg,
244 N. Y. 438, 155 N. E. 733 (1927) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1954, 1955 (Rev. ed.
1938) ; Notes, 17 So. CALIF. L. REv. 173 (1944) ; 33 VA. L. REv. 488 (1947). As to com-
mercial frustration and war contracts see Notes, 137 A. L. R. 1199 (1942) ; 147 A. L. R.
1273 (1943) ; 148 A. L. R. 1382 (1944) ; 149 A. L. R. 1447 (1944) ; 150 A. L. R. 1413
(1944) ; 151 A. L. R. 1447 (1944) ; 152 A. L. R. 1447 (1944). As to recovery for money
paid or services rendered under a frustrated contract see: 6 WILLISTON, CONTR ACTS § 1974
(Rev. ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 468 (1932); 56 HARV. L. REv. 307 (1942);
21 AUST. L. J. 472 (1948) (statutory control).
3. The elements listed above will not be found in that order or stated in the same
terms in all the cases. See, e.g., Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F. 2d 558 (C. C. A. 7th 1945) ;
Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App. 2d 430, 127 P. 2d 1027 (1942) ; Autry v. Republic Pro-
ductions, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 144, 180 P. 2d 888 (1947) ; Berline v. Waldschmidt, 159 Kan.
585, 156 P. 2d 865 (1945) ; Henjes Marine, Inc. v. White Construction Co., 58 N. Y. S.
2d 384 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; United Socieffes Committee v. Madison Square Garden Corp.,
186 Misco 516, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; In-re Bond and Mortgage Guarantee
Co., 267 N. Y. 419, 196 N. E. 313 (1935); Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K. B. 493;
Morgan v. Manser, [1947] 2 All E. R. 666, 21 AusT. L. J. 472 (1948) ; 6 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS §§ 1935, 1954 (Rev. ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 288 (1932);
Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COL. L. REV. 903, 943 (1942); see
note, 148 A. L. R. 1382 (1944).
4. See note 3 supra.
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pening,5 which causes an actual but not a technical failure of consideration. 6
Some courts assimilate the concept of frustration to that of constructive con-
dition,7 i.e., the parties contracted with a certain state of facts in mind and
when these facts are changed or fail to materialize due to fortuitous events,
the intention of the parties has been frustrated and the promisor is excused.
The doctrine of commercial frustration is essentially an equitable one;S
and the reasoning of the court in the instant case is clearly sound and logical.
The desired object recognized by both parties in entering into the contract
was the sale and purchase of the old home, not the construction of the new one.
The true consideration for the promise to convey the premises was the pur-
chase price the value of which had in no way been destroyed. In the contract
the promisor (vendor) recognized the possibilities of building difficulties, and
this contingency was, at least, partially provided for in the contract, in that a
definite date for delivery of the premises was not set. The court thus
properly refused to apply the doctrine of commerical frustration.
CRIMINAL LAW-CUMULATIVE SENTENCES-EFFECT OF STATE
PAROLE UPON COMMENCEMENT OF FEDERAL SENTENCE
Petitioner, while serving a state sentence, was tried, convicted and sen-
tenced by a federal court, the sentence to "begin to run at the expiration of the
sentence now being served." Thereafter, the state paroled and delivered the
petitioner to the federal authorities, by whom he has since been incarcerated.
He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the federal sentence
should not commence until the expiration of his parole. Held, petition denied.
The state sentence had expired, at least insofar as it was an obstacle to service
of the federal sentence. Hunter v. Martin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1030 (1948).
In the field of criminal law enforcement the federal and state govern-
ments, on the basisof comity, have worked out mutual agreements designed
to facilitate the handling of prisoners. The cases agree that where both state
and federal authorities have criminal charges against the same person, either
government may surrender the custody of the prisoner to the other juris-
5. See note 2 supra.
6. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1935 (Rev. ed. 1938), in discussing the doctrine of
frustration uses the descriptive term "failure of consideration." It has been suggested that
this is an unfortunate confusion of terms. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts,
42 COL. L. REv. 903, 951 (1942).
1 7. These cases are discussed in Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42
COL. L. REv. 903, 943 (1942) ; McNair, Frustration of Contracts by War, 56 L. Q. Rzv.
173 (1940) ; Note, 40 ILL. L. REv. 290 (1945).
8. Johnson v. Atkins, 53 Cal. App. 2d 430, 127 P. 2d 1027 (1942) ; Berline v. Wald-
schmidt, 159 Kan. 585, 156 P. 2d 865 (1945) ; It re Bond and Mortgage Guarantee Co.,
167 N. Y. 419, 196 N. E. 313 (1935); Farlou Realty Corp. v. Woodsom Associates, Inc.,
49 N. Y. S. 2d 367 (Sup. Ct. 1944). aff'd 294 I\. Y. 846, 62 N. E. 2d 396 (1945) ; Morgan
v. Manser, [1947] 2 All E. R. 666.
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diction without prejudicing his rights.' However, there is a conflict of authority
on the issue presented by the principal case, that is: does a federal court sen-
tence which is stated to commence upon the expiration of a currently running
state sentence entitle a prisoner, who has obtained a state parole, to temporary
freedom during the period of.his parole? ' The cases concede that no federal
statute is involved in this question. 3 It is a matter of judicial interpretation of
the term "expiration of sentence." 4
Those cases which hold that a prisoner is entitled to his liberty rely upon
legal technicalities. 5 These courts interpret the term "expiration of sentence"
to mean the total legal termination of all physical and constructive control of
the prisoner.6 For a definition of "constructive control," they resort to a time
honored principle of comity. This principle states that the court which first
asserts jurisdiction over a person, be it federal or state, may continue its
assertion without interference from the other sovereign. If, therefore, a state
court convicts and imprisons a criminal, and subsequently paroles him, these
courts rationalize that the parolee remains constructively a prisoner in the
legal custody of the state, and therefore, under the rules of comity, is immune
from federal incarceration.8
Other cases, including the principal case, construe the term "expiration
of sentence" to mean the termination of actual physical imprisonment. 9 These
cases hold that after a state prisoner is released on parole, he may be im-
1. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. 309, 66 L. Ed. 607 (1922) ; Rosen-
thai v. Hunter, 164 F. 2d 949 (C. C. A. 10th 1947) ; United States ex rel. Lombardo v.
McDonnell, 153 F. 2d 919 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 872 (1946);
Johnston v. Wright, 137 F. 2d 914 (C. C. A. 9th 1943); Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F. 2d
865 (C. C. A. 10th 1940) ; Cato v. Smith, 104 F. 2d 885 (C. C. A. 9th 1939), ccrt. denied,
308 U. S. 608 (1939) ; United States v. Robinson, 74 F. Supp. 427 (W. D. Ark. 1947) ;
Ohrazada v. Turner, 164 Kan. 581, 190 P. 2d 413 (1948) ; People ex rel. McCarthy v.
Ragen, 389 Ill. 172, 58 N. E. 2d 872 (1945) ; 8 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 6340 (1931).
2. Parolee is entitled to temporary freedom: Johnston v. Wright, 137 F. 2d 914
(C. C. A. 9th 1943); cf. Tippitt v. Squier, 145 F. 2d 211 (C. C. A. 9th 1944). Contra:
Hunter v. Martin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1030 (1948) ; United States ex reL Lombardo v. McDonnell,
153 F. 2d 919 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 872 (1946) ; Kirk v. Squier, 150
F. 2d 3 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 775 (1945) ; cf. Rosenthal v. Hunter,
164 F. Zd 949 (C. C. A. 10th 1947) ; United States v. Robinson, 74 F. Supp. 427 (W. D.
Ark. 1947).
3. Ellerbrake v. King, 116 F. 2d 168, 170 (C. C. A. 8th 1940). See annotation to 18
U. S. C. A. § 709a (Supp. 1948).
4. Hunter v. Martin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1030 (1948). The trial court's ambiguous phrase-
ology might have been avoided if the sentence had read "upon release from the state
penitentiary" rather than "at the expiration of sentence." Under the former, it is clear
that any release, absolute or conditional, would have alloved the federal authorities
immediately to seize the petitioner.
5. Johnston v. Wright, 137 F. 2d 914 (C. C. A. 9th 1943) ; cf. Tippitt v. Squier, 145
F. 2d 211 (C. C. A. 9th 1944).
6. Johnston v. Wright, 137 F. 2d 914 (C. C. A. 9th 1943).
7. 8 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 6340 (1931).
8. Johnston v. Wright, 137 F. 2d 914 (C. C. A. 9th 1943); see Ex parle Taylor,
216 Cal. 113, 13 P. 2d 906, 907 (1932).
9. Hunter v. Martin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1030 (1948) ; United States ex rel. Lombardo v.
McDonnell, 153 F. 2d 919 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 872 (1946); Kirk
v. Squier, 150 F. 2d 3 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 775 (1945) ; cf. Rosen-
thal v. Hunter, 164 F. 2d 949 (C. C. A. 10th 1947) ; United States v. Robinson, 74 F.
Supp. 427 (W. D. Ark. 1947).
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mediately imprisoned by federal authorities pursuant to a sentence stated to
commence at the expiration of the state sentence.10 These courts admit that
under the rules of comity a state might forbid any federal interference with its
parolee if it should choose to do so. They hold, however, that silence and
apparent acquiescence of the state authorities to federal incarceration of the
parolee imputes a waiver of the state's jurisdiction." These courts reason that
there is even greater probability that a state intends to yield its custody of a
criminal to the federal government when the state officials physically deliver
him into the hands of federal authorities. 12 While these courts concede that
a parolee's state sentence is not technically over,13 they hold that so far as it
might serve as a bar to federal imprisonment, the state sentence is termi-
nated.
14
Although most courts adopting the second view do not so state in their
opinions, it appears that their underlying reason for refusing the prisoner
temporary freedom is simply that they do not feel he has a standing to ques-
tion proper state and federal negotiations concerning his custody. 15 Further,
these courts are obviously concerned with the possible adverse effect such
temporary freedom would have upon society.
This latter position is a demonstration of the tendency of courts to look
through legalistic technicalities and do sensible justice where a question of
the sentencing of criminals is involved. It even considers the deleterious and
pronounced anti-social effects on a parolee himself who could look forward
to nothing better than another term of imprisonment.' 6 True, it brushes aside
the niceties of "legal custody" 17 as contrasted with "physical custody," but
10. Hunter v. Martin, 68 Stip. Ct. 1030 (1948) ; United States er rel. Lombardo v.
McDonnell, 153 F. 2d 919 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 872 (1946) ; Kirk
v. Squier, 150 F. 2d 3 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 775 (1945).
11. Cases cited note 2 supra.
12. Hunter v. Martin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1030 (1948) ; Kirk v. Squier, 150 F. 2d 3 (C. C. A.
9th 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 775 (1945) ; Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F. 2d 865 (C. C. A.
10th 1940); accord, People ex rel. McCarthy v. Ragen, 389 Ill. 172, 58 N. E. 2d 872
(1945).
13. If such a prisoner is released by the federal government before the termination of
his state parole, the state may elect to re-incarcerate him. See Kirk v. Squier, 150 F. 2d 3,
7 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 775 (1945).
14. Cases cited note 2 supra.
15. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254, 262, 42 Sup. Ct. 309, 66 L. Ed. 607 (1922);
Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F. 2d 865, 866 (C. C. A. 10th 1940); Ohrazada v. Turner, 164
Kan. 581, 190 P. 2d 413, 416 (1948). The Wall case expressly states: "[E]ither the
federal or a state government may voluntarily surrender its prisoner to the other without
the consent of the prisoner, and in such circumstances the question of jurisdiction and
custody is purely one of comity between the two sovereigns, not a personal right of the
prisoner which he can assert in a proceeding of this kind." Id. at 866.
16. See Tippitt v. Squier, 145 F. 2d 211, 212 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) : The primary and
basic purpose of parole statutes is to enable a prisoner "to find some 'honorable and useful
employment while upon parole.' . . . Obviously such reform would be frustrated where
during the parole period on a first sentence the parolee is looking forward to another term
of imprisonment on a second sentence."
17. "In the case of a parolee, the judgment is a sentence and commitment. The
legal position conferred upon the party by such judgment is the obligation to serve the
designated term in prison. Until that sentence is terminated, the judgment committing
him to the custody of the prison authorities is still in effect. The additional liberty con-
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in so doing it adopts a realistic approach to an important problem in criminal
law enforcement. As stated in the instant case, "To hold otherwise would
mean that a man already adjudged guilty of a serious federal crime would be
left at large and free of all restraint for an interlude." 18 It appears that
the courts which have adopted the second view have chosen the better approach,
better for the practical exigencies of criminal law enforcement and, in the last
analysis, better for society.
EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF SPOUSES-INADMISSIBLE IN
DIVORCE ACTION FOR CRUELTY
A husbant filed a bill for divorce on the ground of cruelty. Before the
case was heard the wife was adjudged insane; consequently so much of the
husband's deposition as related to "transactions and conversations with and
statements by" the wife was excluded under Tennessee Code Section 9779,1
which renders inadmissable testimony as to transactions with an opposite
party now incapacitated. On appeal, complainant contended that section 9777,2
which abrogated the common law party-disqualification rule, should be con-
strued in pari inateria with section 9779 and would make the evidence ad-
missible. Held, evidence properly excluded under section 9779. There is no
basis for construction of the two sections in pari inateria. In *the second place
the evidence would not be admissible under section 9777. Jackson v. Jackson,
210 S. W. 2d 332 (Tenn. 1948).
Although this seems to be the first reported case in which code section
9779 is applied, the real importance of the decision lies in the interpretation
given to section 9777. The language of the court on this latter point may be
dictum, for section 9779, standing alone, would clearly exclude the testimony.
On the other hand the court's interpretation of section 9777 may he considered
an alternate ground for the decision. At any rate the position taken by the
court is at odds with previous decisions, and suggests an important change
in Tennessee divorce law.
ferred by the parole is a result of action by the Board of Pardons, an administrative body.
The parolee is still in custodia legis, and under the control of the State Board, though
outside prison walls." McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P. 2d 721, 723 (1945).
18. 68 Sup. Ct. at 1030 (1948).
1. "It shall not be lawful for any party to any action, suit, or proceeding to testify
as to any transaction or conversation with, or statement by, any opposite party in interest,
if such opposite party is incapacitated or disqualified to testify thereto, by reason of idiocy,
lunacy, or insanity, unless called by the opposite side, and then only in the discretion of
the court." TENN. CODE AxNN. § 9779 (Williams, 1934).
2. "In all civil actions, no person shall be incompetent to testify because he is a party
to, or interested in, the issue tried, or because of the disabilities of coverture, but all
persons including husband and wife, shall be competent witnesses, though neither husband
nor wife shall testify as to any matter that occurred between them by virtue of or in
consequence of the marital relation." TENN. ConE ANN. § 9777 (Williams, 1934).
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In E. W. M. v. I. C. M. 3 the court of chancery appeals held the prohibi-
tion, contained in section 9777, against testimony by the spouses concerning
their marital affairs did not apply in a suit for divorce on the ground of
cruelty. Recognizing this prohibition to be based upon a public policy which
would protect the sanctity of marriage by promoting confidence and trust
between the spouses, 4 the court held that in a divorce proceeding the reason
for the rule entirely fails. 5 Shortly thereafter, the supreme court in Gardner
v. Gardner6 reversed a lower court for refusing to allow a wife to testify to
acts of cruelty, saying : "The practice is now settled by this Court that husband
and wife are competent witnesses in divorce proceedings and may testify in
respect of any acts of cruelty offered the one by the other." ¢
It is therefore surprising that in the present case the court treats the
question as open. Gardner v. Gardner was -apparently overlooked. The court
did not follow E. W. M. v. I. C. M., stating that the authority of that case
was denied by the followinig quotation from Hunt v. Hunt :8 "It has not been
decided that a husband or wife is incompetent as a witness as to the matters
proscribed [by section 9777] when the litigation is directly between them-
selves. . . . It is not necessary to determine the question here." This was
dictum.9 Furthermore, the suit was brought to impress a trust; it was not
a divorce case, and the quotation must be read in the light of that fact. Patton
v. Wilson,'0 decided before the passage of the statute, is also cited as reserving
the question, but the question there reserved seems to be whether husband
and wife, as adverse parties, are competent to testify at all-a question no
longer in doubt.
The court, then, considering itself free of controlling authority, re-
examined the statute, finding it clear and "containing no language that would
justify an exception by construction:" The court concluded that the statute,
construed literally, would apply in divorce proceedings. But a contrary inter-
pretation is possible without resorting to an exception by construction. The
preservation of the marital disqualification in section 9777, is a restatement
of the common law rule." The common law marital disqualification did not
3. 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 463 (1897).
4. Patton v. Wilson, 70 Tenn. 101 (1878); Kimbrough v. Mitchell, 38 Tenn. 539
(1858) ; Brewer v. Ferguson, 30 Tenn. 565 (1857).
5. Wigmore agrees with this position. 8 WIGAoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2239, 2338 (3d ed.
1940). See Note, 70 A. L. R. 499-506 (1931).
6. 104 Tenn. 410, 58 S. W. 342 (1900). The court cites the unreported case of Malone
v. Malone, Knoxville, September Term, 1898.
7. Id. at 413, 58 S. W. at 343.
8. 169 Tenn. 1, 14, 80 S. W. 2d 666, 671 (1935).
9. On trial the evidence had been admitted without objection. No objection was,
therefore, available upon appeal.
10. 70 Tenn. 101 (1878).
11. Covert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531, 14 S. W. 2d 735 (1929) ; McCormick v. State,
135 Tenn. 218, 186 S. W. 95 (1916) ; Orr v. Cox, 71 Tenn. 617 (1879) ; Patton v. Wilson,
70 Tenn. 101 (1878).
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prevent one spouse from testifying to physical mistreatment by the other. 12
Such testimony was admissible except in those cases where the testifying
spouse was a party. It was there inadmissible only because of the rule dis-
qualifying all parties. Where parties, including husband and wife, are compe-
tent witnesses by statute the injured spouse should logically be able to testify
to maltreatment in a divorce suit, since this testimony is within the well-
recognized exception to the marital disqualification. 13
Exclusion of such testimony in divorce cases undermines the very policy
that lies beneath the marital disqualification rule. The rule is designed to
protect the sanctity of marriage. In this type of case it protects in a very
real sense the spouse who has destroyed that sanctity.
For several reasons the present decision ought not to be regarded as
settling the law: (1) The alternate holding was not necessary to the decision.
(2) The contrary authority of the Gardner case was overlooked. (3) Well-
established principles of common law would seem to require a contrary result.
In any event, the legislature might well resolve all doubt by amending the
statute expressly to allow either husband or wife to testify to any act of
cruelty committed by one against the other.
JUDGMENTS-ESTOPPEL TO DENY VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
VOID FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner, a domiciliary of South Carolina, obtained a divorce in Georgia
by misrepresenting her residence. She then married the deceased, who had
aided her in procuring the divorce. On the latter's death, respondent, his
father and heir, sought to be appointed administrator of his estate. Petitioner,
as the deceased's widow, claimed a preferred right to administer the estate.
Respondent alleged that petitioner was not the widow of the deceased because
the Georgia divorce from her previous husband was void for want of juris-
diction. Petitioner, contended that respondent was estopped to challenge the
validity of the divorce decree. Held, that the divorce was invalid and that
petitioner's unclean hands barred her from invoking an estoppel against
respondent. Ex parte Nimmer, 47 S. E. 2d 716 (S. C. 1948).
The question of whether a person should be estopped from challenging
12. Soule's Case, 5 Greenl. 407 (Me. 1828) ; Bentley v. Cooke, 3 Doug. 422, 99 Eng.
Rep. 729 (K. B. 1784); Lord Audley's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 401, s.c. Hut. 115, 123
Eng. Rep. 1140 (1631); cf. Norman v. State, 127 Tenn. 340, 155 S. W. 135 (1912)
(wife can testify in criminal case against husband as to injuries inflicted against her dur-
ing marriage but not as to act of intercourse in violation of age of consent if she subse-
quently voluntarily married him).
13. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2239, 2338 (3d ed. 1940) ; Stebbins v. Anthony, 5 Colo.
348 (1880) ; People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 8 Paige 47 (N. Y. Ch. 1839).
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the validity of a divorce decree arises in a multitude of fact situations.'
A court's decision to bar such a challenge involves the resolution of a number
of conflicting policies. 2 With the presence of these conflicting policies and of
the wide variety of facts which may control the decisions a conflict of au-
thority is to be expected. Much of this conflict arises, however, from the
use of distinguishable precedents. A detailed analysis of the cases will indicate
which of the various factors are controlling, and a comprehensive classifica-
tion of these cases will point out which of the various policies and equitable
principles are applicable in a particular case.3
Cases where a party to a divorce decree is attacking it as void for want
of jurisdiction and where no new marriage relationship has been entered
into may be grouped together. In this class a distinction has been made be-
tween those in which the continuation of the marital status is in issue and
those in which property or pecuniary rights are involved.4 In the former
type the public policy favoring the final determination of such issues in
order that the parties may be assured of their status is of paramount im-
portance; 5 but in the latter type that policy is not controlling and the cases
may be dealt with according to general equitable principles. 6
Cases where a new marital relationship has been created in reliance
on the void divorce decree form a second class. These cases may be divided
into those in which the new relationship is still in existence and those in which
that relationship has been dissolved by the death of one of the parties. Public
policy in the former group favors the preservation of the new relationship as
a going concern, 7 unless by so doing the rights of some innocent party would
be injured.8 This policy is recognized regardless of the character of the
1. See, e.g., the cases collected in Notes, 109 A. L. R. 1018 (1937), 120 A. L. R.
815 (1939), 122 A. L. R. 1321 (1939), 140 A. L. R. 914 (1942), 153 A. L. R. 941 (1944).
2. For a general discussion of these policies see Note, 21 VA. E. REv. 797 (1935).
3. A comprehensive classification of the cases is made in Jacobs, Attacks on Decrees
of Divorce, 34 MIcH. L. REv. 749, 959 (1936).
4. Hamm v. Hamm, 204 S. W. 2d 113 (Tenn. App. 1947), 1 VANDERBILT L. REv.
161.
5. Smith v. Smith, 13 Gray 209 (Mass. 1859); Vose v. Vose, 280 N. Y. 779, 21
N. E. 2d 616 (1939); Shannon v. Shannon, 247 App. Div. 790, 286 N. Y. Supp. 27 (2d
Dept. 1936); Hamm v. Hamm, 204 S. W. 2d 113 (Tenn. App. 1947). Contra: Smith v.
Smith, 36 F. Supp. 412 (D. C. 1940) ; Stevens v. Stevens, 273 N. Y. 157, 7 N. E. 2d 26
(1937) ; cf. Lippincott v. Lippincott, 141 Neb. 186, 3 N. W. 2d 207 (1942).
6. Sammons v. Pike, 107 Minn. 430, 120 N. W. 540 (1909); Romanski's Estate, 354
Pa. 261, 47 A. 2d 233 (1946) ; Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877
(4th Dept. 1934), aff'd iere., 266 N. Y. 532, 195 N. E. 186 (1935) ; ln re Feyh's Estate,
52 Hun. 102, 5 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1889). The requisites of a true estoppel are
not necessary to bar one from challenging a void divorce. Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan.
679, 95 Pac. 576 (1908); Krause v., Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d 290 (1940).
However, the court may use the fact that the requisites are not met as a basis for deny-
ing the estoppel. Ainscow v. Alexander, 39 A. 2d 54 (Del. Super. Ct. 1944); Wampler v.
Wampler, 25 Wash. 2d 258, 170 P. 2d 316 (1946). Some courts have refused the doctrine
altogether. Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Il. 388, 12 N. E. 737 (1887) ; In re Christiansen's
Estate, 17 Utah 412, 53 Pac. 1003 (1898).
7. Goodloe v. Hawke, 113 F. 2d 753 (App. D. C. 1940), 9 GEo. WAsH. L. RFv. 356
(1941).
8. Situations in which the new(relationship is still in existence may be grouped into
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action in which the challenge is made. However, in cases in which the re-
lationship no longer exists this policy may have less weight.Y A further dis-
tinction should be made in this latter group between cases in which the
surviving spouse is challenging the decree in order to set up some rights
against his former spouse, 10 and those in which a representative of the de-
ceased spouse raises the invalidity of the void decree in order to prevent the
surviving second spouse from claiming any rights in the deceased's estate."
the following categories: First, where the petitioner in a divorce action has married one
who aided him in obtaining it, the spouse who aided should ordinarily be estopped from
challenging the validity of the decree. Goodloe v. Hawke, 113 F. 2d 753 (App. D. C.
1940); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 161 P. 2d 490 (1945); Van Slyke v.
Van Slyke, 186 Mich. 324, 152 N. W. 921 (1915) ; Margulles v. Margulles, 109 N. J. Eq.
391, 157 Atl. 676 (Ch. 1931) ; Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22, 19,N. Y. S. 2d 667 (Sup.
Ct. 1940); Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 116, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dept.
1917). Contra: Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S. E. 2d 818 (1944) ; Brunel
v. Brunel, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Hughey v. Ray, 207 S. C. 374, 36 S. E.
2d 33 (1945). The petitioner should be estopped. See Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22,
19 N. Y. S. 2d 667, 668 (Sup. Ct. 1940). But see Campbell v. Campbell, 62 N. Y. S. 2d
245, 246 (Sup. Ct. 1946). The respondent in the divorce action should not be estopped
unless she has in some way accepted the benefits of the decree or is guilty of laches.
(No cases).
Second, where the petitioner in the divorce action has married an innocent spouse that
spouse should not be estopped unless she has accepted the benefits of the decree. Lefferts
v. Lefferts, 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933). But cf. Farr v. Farr, 190 Iowa 1005,
181 N. W. 208 (1921) ; Deyette v. Deyette, 92 Vt. 305, 104 Atl. 232 (1918). The peti-
tioner should be.estopped, whether in an action against the first spouse or her representa-
tives, Way v. Way, 132 S. C. 288, 128 S. E. 705 (1928) ; or against the second spouse,
Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d 290 (1940) ; McIntyre v. McIntyre, 211
N. C. 698, 191 S. E. 507 (1937). The respondent should not be estopped unless she is
guilty of laches or has accepted the benefits of the decree, whether in an action against
the petitioner, Bethune v. Bethune, 94 S. W. 2d 1043 (Ark. 1936) ; or against petitioner's
representative or second spouse, Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 292, 19 Atil. 82 (1890)
(estoppel-respondent accepted the benefits of the decree).
Third, where the respondent in the divorce action has remarried, the second spouse
should not be estopped unless she can be said to have accepted the benefits of the decree
or to be guilty of laches. (No cases). The respondent should be estopped, either in an
action against the second spouse, Hansen v. Hansen, 185 Misc. 443, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 331
(Sup. Ct. 1945) ; see Loftis v. Dearing, 201 S. W. 2d 655 (Tenn. 1947) ; or in an action
against'the petitioner'or his representative, In re Kyle, 176 P. 2d 96 (Cal. App. 1947) ;
Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 147, 25 Pac. 81 (1890); Mohler v. Shank, 93 Iowa 273, 61
N. W. 981 (1895); lit re Bingham's Will, 265 App. Div. 48, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 756 (2d
Dept. 1943) ; Cummings v. Huddleston, 99 Okla. 195, 226 Pac. 104 (1924). The petitioner
in the divorce action should also be estopped to deny the validity of the divorce, either in an
action against the. respondent, Mirsky v. Mirsky, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
Contra: Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 91 N. J. Eq. 261, 110 Atl. 19 (Ch. 1920) ; Querze
v. Querze, 290 N. Y. 13, 47 N. E. 2d 423 (1943) ; or against respondent's representative
or second spouse, Marvin v. Foster, 61 Minn. 154, 63 N. W. 484 (1895) ; Starbuck v.
Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1903) ; In re Robottom's Estate, 248 App. Div.
137, 288 N. Y. Supp. 397 (2d Dept. 1936). But cf. In re Hensgen's Estate, 181 P. 2d 69
(Cal. App. 1947).
9. It might be held to protect those incidents of the relationship which remain after
the death of the spouse, e.g., legitimacy of children, widow's rights, etc.
10. No cases could be found directly on the point, but since the surviving spouse has
accepted the benefits of the divorce decree he should not be heard to challenge its
validity, especially when his purpose is to obtain more property from his former spouse.
11. The representative of a decedent who married the petitioner in the divorce action
could not challenge the validity of that divorce decree, where decedent aided in pro-
curing the decree, In re Davis's Estate, 38 Cal. App. 2d 576, 101 P. 2d 761 (1940). Con-
tra: Ainscow v. Alexander, 39 A. 2d 54 (Del. Super. Ct. 1944), reversing 34 A. 2d 593
(Del. Orphans' Ct 1943); In re Ferry's Estate, 155 Misc. 198, 279 N. Y. Supp. 919
(Surr. Ct. 1935); or merely accepted the benefits of that decree, In re Blum's Estate,
185 Misc. 43, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 651 (Surr. Ct. 1945). Contra: Bell v. Little, 237 N. Y. 519,
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The instant case is of the latter type. The fact that the heir or the admin-
istrator of the deceased is attacking the decree, rather that the deceased
himself, should make no difference in the application of the controlling equi-
table principles, because where the deceased would be estopped, the heir
or administrator should be estopped.
12
In the instant case the deceased aided in the procurement of the void
decree.' 3 He accepted the benefits of that decree. 14 He should be estopped to
deny its validity. The court, however, refused to allow the petitioner to raise
the estoppel, on the ground that she came into court with unclean hands and
hence should be denied equitable relief. In thus estopping the petitioner the
court in effect granted equitable relief to one who stood in no better position.
Petitioner should not have been estopped from questioning respondent's
right to challenge the divorce decree. Her wrongdoing should merely have
formed the basis for estopping her in case she sought to challenge that decree
herself. 15 The deceased, his heir or administrator, and the petitioner each
should have been denied the right to challenge the validity of the Georgia
decree.
JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA-OPERATION AS COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In 1917 the United States seized property. belonging to a German
alien.' After returning it in 1924, the United State§ sued the alien's estate
for the value of this property on the grounds that the return had been made
under a mistake of law and because of fraudulent representations. The United
States obtained a judgment based solely on the ground that there was a
142 N. E. 726 (1923). The representative of the petitioner in the divorce action could not
challenge the validity of that divorce. It re Brandt's Estate, 190 P. 2d 497 (Ariz. 1948) ;
Hynes v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 273 N. Y. 612, '7 N. E. 2d 719 (1937); Watson
v. Watson, 172 S. C. 362, 174 S. E. 33 (1934). Contra: In re Lindgren's Estate, 293
N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. 2d 849 (1944) ; In re Grossman's Estate, 263 Pa. 139, 101 Atl. 86 (1919).
The representative of a respondent in a divorce action was estopped to challenge the
validity of the divorce decree because the respondent had accepted the benefits of the
decree by remarrying. Loftis v. Dearing, 201 S. W. 2d 655 (Tenn. 1947).
12. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 1059, 1061 (5th ed. 1925).
13. Such conduct ordinarily forms a basis for an estoppel. Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.
App. 2d 657, 161 P. 2d 490 (1945). But cf. Hughey v. Ray, 207 S. C. 374, 36 S. E. 2d 33
(1945) (decision based on policy in matrimonial actions and not on general equitable
principles). See also Jacobs, Attacks on Decrees of Divorce by Second Spouses, 15 N. C.
L. REv. 136 (1937).
14. Many cases have based an estoppel on acceptance of the benefits of the decree.
E.g., Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 147, 25 Pac. 81 (1890) ; In re Bingham's Will, 265 App.
Div. 48, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 756 (2d Dept. 1943); Loftis v. Dearing, 201 S. W. 2d 655
(Tenn. 1947).
15. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court and after obtaining the relief
desired, repudiate the action on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction. Bledsoe v.
Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576 (1908); Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E.
2d 290 (1940).
1. Seizure was made under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 STAT. 411 (1917),
50 U. S. C. A. App. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
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mistake of law. The issue of fraud was not determined.2 While attempting
to satisfy this judgment through a claim in the administration proceedings
of the alien's estate in the New York Surrogate Court, the Government
raised the issue of fraud on the part of the alien, his lawyer, and the admin-
istrator of the alien's estate. The Surrogate Court ruled that there had been
no fraud, and the result was a partial satisfaction of the claim of the
United States from the estate.3 No appeal was ever taken. The present action
was instituted by the United States against the alien's attorney to recover
the remainder of its judgment, and the claim was based on the same issue
of fraud that had been raised and determined in the New York Surrogate
Court: Held, that the issue had been decided in the proceeding before the
New York Surrogate Court and under the doctrine of collateral estoppel
could not be raised in this different cause of action. United Slates v. Silliman,
167 F. 2d 607 (C. C. A. 3d 1948).
The doctrine of res judicata is that a valid final judgment rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter is con-
clusive as between the parties and their privies.4 The result is that persons
bound by a judgment may sometimes be prevented from showing the actual
truth, but public policy is held to justify the application of res judicata.5
Within this doctrine, a valid judgment 6 operates (1) as a bar, where a
judgment for the defendant on the merits of a case extinguishes the cause of
action and bars the parties and their privies from litigating a subsequent suit on
the same cause of action,7 (2) by way of inerger, where a judgment for the
plaintiff creates new rights, and the cause of action is merged into the judg-
ment, or (3) by way of collateral estoppel,8 where the same parties or their
2. United States v. Rodiek, 117 F. 2d 588, 594 (C. C. A. 2d 1941), aff'd, 315 U. S.
783 (1942) (equally divided court).
3. In re Hackfeld's Estate, 180 Misc. 406, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 60 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
4. Johnson Co. v. Wharton,, 152 U. S. 252, 14 Sup. Ct. 608, 38 L. Ed. 429 (1894);
30 Am. JUR., Judgments § 161 (1940).
5. Bennett v. Comm'r, 113 F. 2d 837 (C. C. A. 5th 1940) ; Scott, Collateral Estoppel
by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942). See, however, Cleary, 'Res Judicata Re-
examined, 57 YALE L. J. 339 (1948), where the author lists the public policy arguments
commonly advanced to justify the rule of res judicata as (1) danger of double jeopardy,
(2) desirability of stable judicial determination, (3) freedom from vexatious litigation,
and (4) economy of court time. Cleary states that these arguments are unconvincing, and
that the rules of res judicata are too strict and technical.
6. As to the effect of a void judgment, see McIntosh v. Wiggins, 356 Mo. 926, 204
S. W. 2d 770 (1947) ; 31 Amv. JuR., Judgments § 430 (1940) ; 30 id. § 198 (1940).
7. Henderson v. United States Radiator Corp., 78 F. 2d 674 (C. C. A. 10th 1935).
8. The leading case on the distinction i~etween a judgment operating as a bar or
merger, and a judgment operating as a collateral estoppel is Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 353, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1876), in which the court held that "where the
second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment •
in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points con-
troverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all
cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one
cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry
must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the
original action." See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942).
Collateral estoppel is the same as "estoppel by verdict." Town of Flora v. Indiana Serv-
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privies bring a subsequent suit based upon a different cause of action, and the
former judgment is conclusive between them only as to fact 9 issues raised
and determined by that. judgment.1'
In order for the judgment of a prior action to take effect as a collateral
estoppel, the minimum requirements" to be included in that action are
(1) jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter,12 (2) a raising and
determination of the fact issues now being presented, 13 (3) an ability to
have appealed the judgment, if by a court other than one of final juris-
diction,14 (4) the same parties or their privies as are in this action,' 5 and
(5) a cause of action different from the present one.
16
The court in the instant case, although supporting the policy of giving
ice Corp., 222 Ind. 253, 53 N. E. 2d 161 (1944) ; Holtz v. Beighley, 211 Minn. 153, 300
N. W. 445 (1941). For the distinction between bar, merger and collateral estoppel, see
ESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment a (1942); Note, .udgments-Res Judicata as
Between Co-Defendants, 27 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1943); Note, Res Judicata: The Re-
quirenient of Identity of Parties, 91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 467 (1943); Note, 162 A. L. R.
1204 (1946).
9. For authority to the effect that only ultimate facts, as distinguished from evi-
dentiary facts, are conclusive, see Oglesby v. Attrill, 20 Fed. 570 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1884) ; Christy v. Great Northern Life Ins. Co., 238 Mo. App. 525, 181 S. W. 2d 663
(1944); Notes, 142 A. L. R. 1243 (1943), 152 A. L. R. 1193 (1944). As to whether
collateral estoppel applies to questions of law, see Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308
U. S. 66, 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 84 L. Ed. 85 (1939) ; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 59 Sup.
Ct. 134, 83 L. Ed. 104 (1938); Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed.
26 (1938) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942) ; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judg-
ineut, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1942).
10. To describe the effect of a bar or merger, the phrase "estoppel by judgment" has
been used; to describe the effect of collateral estoppel, the phrase "estoppel by verdict"
has been used. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Hall, 296 Ky. 390, 177 S. W. 2d 150 (1944) ;
Kimpton v. Spellman, 351 Mo. 674, 173 S. W. 2d 886 (1943); 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
§§ 624 et seq. (5th ed. 1925).
11. See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HAgv. L. REv. 1 (1942). Though
the point is not discussed in the instant case, many courts in speaking of the conclusiveness
of a former judgment hold that a mutuality of estoppel must exist between the parties;
in other words, that if a party is not bound by a former judgment, he will not be heard
to asseft that another is bound by it. Tobin v. McClellan, 73 N. E. 2d 679 (Ind. 1947) ;
Sim v. Bishop, 177 Ky. 279, 197 S. W. 625 (1917) ; McIntosh v. Wiggins, 354 Mo. 747,
191 S. W. 2d 637 (1945), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 839 (1946).
12. There are some instances where, even though the court rendering the judgment
in the prior action had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, collateral
estoppel will not be applied because the court in the prior action was not the type of
tribunal whose fact findings should be held as conclusive. Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal.
2d 563, 110 P. 2d 1025 (1941) (small claims court's determination held insufficient);
Loomis v. Loomis, 288 N. Y. 222, 42 N. E. 2d 495 o(1942) (determination by domestic rela-
tions court not conclusive). See also, the instant case, 167 F. 2d at 614 nn. 29, 30. See
generally, RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71 (1942); Note, 147 A. L. R. 196 (1943).
13. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 356, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1876); Oklahoma
ex rel. Comm'rs v. United States, 155 F. 2d 496 (C. C. A. 10th 1946) ; Lorber v. Vista
Irr. Dist., 127 F. 2d 628 (C. C. A. 9th 1942); Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Cor.,
222 Ind. 253, 53 N. E. 2d 161 (1944).
14. Inability to appeal may arise (1) where the controversy has become moot, or
(2) where there is a finding of one or more issues ,against the successful party. If a
party has the right and ability to appeal, but fails to do so, collateral estoppel applies.
See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HAv. L. REv. 1, 15 (1942) ; RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS § 69 (1942).
15. See note 21 infra.
16. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352, 24 L. Ed. 125 (1876). As to
identity of causes of action in general, see Woodbury v. Porter, 158 F. 2d 194 (C. C. A.
8th 1946) ; Note, 64 A. L. R. 663 (1929).
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every litigant a full and fair day in court, held that the New York Surro-
gate Court had jurisdiction to make a finding on the issue of fraud conclusive
in a federal court. 17 The court also held that the Government had raised
the issue of fraud in the Surrogate Court, that the fact that no evidence in
support of the allegation was presented was immaterial, 18 and that since the
order of the Surrogate Court recited the objections made by the United
States and concluded by overruling them, there was a determination of the
fraud issue.19 Apparently, the Government could have appealed to have
errors in the judgment corrected, but failed to do so. 20 There was no ques-
tion but that the parties in the instant case were parties in the Surrogate
Court proceeding, bringing the case within the general rule that collateral
estoppel affects only the parties to the action and those who are in such
relation to the parties as to be considered in privity with them.21 And clearly
the former cause of action was different from the present one. Thus, the
necessary conditions having been satisfied, the court properly applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.
17. For additional authority pertaining to the jurisdiction of the New York Sur-
rogate Court, see Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. 2d 899 (C. C. A. 2d 1945),
cert. denied, 325 U. S. 874 (1945); In re Winslow's Estate, 151 Misc. 298, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 829 (Surr. Ct. 1934); Raymond v. Davis' Estate, 248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421
(1928).
18. Other cases holding that a party may not raise issues for determination and
avoid the effect of an estoppel merely by refusing to present proof are O'Brien v. Man-
waring, 79 Minn. 86, 81 N. W. 746 (1900); Slater v. Skirving, 51 Neb. 108, 70 N. W.
493 (1897). As to the effect of a judgment rendered on default, see Riehle v. Margolies,
279 U. S. 218, 49 Sup. Ct. 310, 73 L. Ed. 669 (1929); Note, 128 A. L. R. 472 (1940).
As to the effect of a judgment rendered on demurrer, see Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp.
432 (N. D. Iowa 1946); Note, 13 A. L. R. 1104 (1921).
19. 167 F. 2d at 617 n. 38.
20. Id. at 618 n. 40. '
21. Miller v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 140 F. 2d 668 (C. C. A. 3d
1944); Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 133 F. 2d 143 (C. C. A. 3d
1943); Conold v. Stern, 138 Ohio St. 352, 35 N. E. 2d 133 (1941); RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 93, comment d (1942); 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 534 (1891). But cf. Coca-
Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 Atl. 260 (1934). For a trend under certain
circumstances to dispense with the strict requirement of identical parties or their privies,
see 61 HARV. L. REv. 370 (1948), 57 HARV. L. REv. 98 (1943). Cases revealing who may
be considered as privies are E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., v. Sylvania Industrial
Corp., 122 F. 2d 400 (C. C. A. 4th 1941); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 120 F. 2d 82 (C. C. A. 3d 1941) (persons controlling the litigation);
Kind v. Stuart Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 727 (N. D. Ga. 1943) (employer-employee rela-
tionship) ; Yrisarri v. Clifford, 32 N. M. 1, 249 Pac. 1011 (1926); Fletcher v. Perry,
104 Vt. 229, 158 Atl. 679 (1932) (bailor-bailee relationship) ; Shipley v. Pittsburgh &
L. E. R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W. D. Pa. 1947) (class action); Pineville Steam Laun-
dry v. Phillips, 254 Ky. 391, 71 S.,W. 2d 980 (1934) (successors to a property interest).
As to privies in general, see Note, 57 HAav. L. REv. 98 (1943). A person may be a
party to an action, however, and neither be bound nor benefitted by collateral estoppel.
Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 (N. D. Iowa 1946) (representative party) ; RESTATE-
MENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 81, 82 (1942) (formal or non-adversary parties).
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JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA AND. JURISDICTION-HABEAS CORPUS TO
ATTACK CONTEMPT CITATION FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT
Overruling a motion by petitioner that it lacked jurisdictiort over the
subject matter, a federal district court appointed an ancillary "receiver in a
partnership accounting. For refusal to testify before a special master ap-
pointed by the court to take testimony for such receiver, petitioner was
adjudged in civil contempt and was committed to jail until he should pay a
fine of $22,000. By writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks release on the
grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the receivership pro-
ceedings and that therefore violation of its orders was not civil contempt.
Held (2-1), writ denied. Petitioner had an opportunity to appeal the juris-
dictional issue; he may not collaterally attack the decision as to iurisdiction,
even though the time for appeal has elapsed. United States ex rel. Sutton
v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
Twenty-five or thirty years ago, the petitioner in the instant case would
have been released on a writ of habeas corpus. If, as the circuit court of
appeals indicated, the district court did lack jurisdiction of the subject matter
then the older authorities would have deemed it axiomatic that its orders
were utterly void and without effect upon the parties.1 Further, as pointed
out in the dissenting'opinion,2 it was formerly a settled principle that juris-
diction over the subject matter could in no way be "conferred" upon a court
by acts of the parties.3 At any point in the proceedings, upon appeal, or in
collateral attack, the issue of jurisdiction might be raised; 4 in the absence
of jurisdiction it was not civil contempt to ignore a court order, and perhaps
it was not even criminal contempt. 5 During the last two or three decades,
1. "One of our oldest dogmas is that if a court has no jurisdiction of the subject
matter of an action its pretended judgment is a nullity." Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject
Matter and Res Judicata, 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 386 (1932) ; It re Sawyer, 124 U. S.
200, 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402 (1888) ; It re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164,
31 L. Ed. 216 (1887); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 5 Sup. Ct. 724, 28 L. Ed. 1117
(1885) ; Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604, 26 L. Ed. 861 (1882) ; 2 BLACK, JUDGAMENTS
§ 513 (1891); BROWN, JURIsDIcTION § 115 (1891); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 333 (5th
ed. 1925).
2. 169 F. 2d at 98.
3. Note, 46 YALE L. J. 159 (1936).
4. Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U. S. 457, 21 L. Ed. 897 (1873).
5. The distinction between "civil" and "criminal" contempt has never been definitely
settled. A much-cited test to distinguish the two types is that stated by the United States
Supreme Court in Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492,
55 L. Ed. 797 (1911), where it was said that civil contempt proceedings are remedial in
nature, designed to preserve and enforce rights of private parties to suits and to compel
obedience to orders made for the benefit of such parties, while criminal contempt pro-
ceedings are punitive in character and are designed to uphold the dignity of the courts.
For a critical discussion of the distinctions drawn between the two types, see Moskovitz,
Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COL. L. REv. 780 (1943) ; cf. Beale,
Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARv. L. REv. 161 (1908) ; Note, Criminal
vs. Civil Contempt, 23 IND. L. J. 114 (1948). Following the doctrine that orders given
by a court without jurisdiction are void for all purposes, many of the earlier cases held
that violation of such orders could noteven be criminal contempt: see, e.g., It re Sawyer
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however, there has been a very sharp break from the older views upon col-
lateral attack of jurisdictional findings.6 Increasingly the courts have held,
in the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, that "The principles of res judicata
apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues."' Accordingly
it has beeh repeatedly held that where a court decides that it has jurisdiction
over the subject matter, its ruling may be res judicata and binding upon the
parties unless and until reversed in direct attack upon appeal.8 This new
doctrine very definitely modifies the older maxims as to judgments rendered
without jurisdiction.
The earlier position was based upon a strong public policy against usurpa-
tion of power by a court,9 while the later view emphasizes the policy of termi-
nating litigation between the parties and giving stability to judgments.10
124 U. S. 200, 8 Sup. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402 (1888); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713,
5 Sup. Ct. 724, 28 L. Ed. 1117 (1885). That this is not the law today is clearly laid down
in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed.
884 (1947), where it was held that one is not guilty of civil contempt for violation of
the order of a court which is subsequently, on direct appeal, found to lack jurisdiction,
but that it is criminal contempt to violate such an order where the court had ruled that
it -had jurisdiction to issue the order. Since that case did not involve the problem of
collateral attack, it may be distinguished from the principal case in so far as the issue of
civil contempt is concerned. In the light of that case, however, there seems to be little
doubt that the petitioner in the principal case could have been cited for criminal con-
tempt as well as for civil contempt.
6. For a discussion of the trend of modern decisions applying the doctrine of res
judicata to jurisdictional questions, see Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16
U. OF Cii. L. Rev. 86 (1948); treatments of the subject will also be found in Note,
Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 COL. L. REv. 1006 (1940) and Rashid, The Full
Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack of Jurisdictional Issues, 36 GE. L. J. 154
(1948).
7. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 166, 53 Sup. Ct. 98, 77 L. Ed.
231 (1932).
8. See, e.g., Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178, 180, 67 Sup. Ct. 1588, 91 L. Ed. 1982
(1946) ; Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U. S. 494, 499, 503, 61 Sup. Ct. 326, 85 L. Ed.
297 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 403, 60 Sup. Ct.
907, 84 L. Ed. 1263 (1940) ; Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308
U. S. 371, 376, 378, 60 Sup. Ct. 317, 84 L. Ed. 329 (1940) ; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165,
171, 172, 59 Sup. Ct. 134, 83 L. Ed. 104 (1938) ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 40, 59 Sup.
Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 26 (1938). Earlier cases were concerned with the application of res
judicata to rulings on jurisdiction over the person. Not until the decision in Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 59 Sup. Ct. 134, 83 L. Ed. 104 (1938), was it apparent that the
doctrine applied to rulings on jurisdiction over the subject matter as well. Prior to that
case it was believed that the doctrine could not be extended to cases where a court had
ruled that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, because of the settled principle
tiat such jurisdiction could not in any way be "conferred" upon a court. See GooDRICu,
CONFLICT OF LAvs § 20 (2d ed. 1938) ; R STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451 (1934).
For discussions of the extension of res judicata to rulings on jurisdiction of the subject
matter, see Note, Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 HARv. L.
REv. 652. (1940) ; 49 YALE L. J. 959 (1940).
9. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942).
10. Medina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction, 31 CoL. L. REV. 238 (1931).
See the dictum of Mr. Justice Reed in Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 167, 59 Sup. Ct.
134, 83 L. Ed. 104 (1938). That the new view has not been accepted without vigorous
and able dissent in high places, however, is evidenced by the opinion of Judge Frank in
the instant case. For other criticisms of the doctrine of res judicata as applied to juris-
dictional issues, see the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Sunal v. Large,
332 U. S. 174, 187, 67 Sup. Ct. 1588, 91 L. Ed. 1982 (1946) ; and in United States v.
United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 342, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947) ; ef.
dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sunal v. Large, supra at 184. In Bowen v. Johnston,
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Once a court of general jurisdiction has decided that it has jurisdiction, the
new view is that that determination may be collaterally attacked only in "ex-
ceptional circumstances." "1 Although the courts havd given few criteria for
determining just when jurisdictional rulings may be collaterally attacked when
there has been an opportunity to appeal, it is suggested that the cases may be
explained upon the basis of delegation of authority. All judicial power lies
in the State. The courts are agencies of the State with authority to act within
constitutional and statutory limitations. Where those limits have been made
narrow, as in a magistrate's court or other minor court, then clearly that
court, like a special 'agent, will not be allowed to exceed the boundaries of
authority; close scrutiny will be given to its actions to determine that they fall
within the prescribed scope, and collateral attack will be available if they do
not,' 2 Here the policy against usurpation of power is particularly strong. But
where wide powers have been conferred upon a court by the State, then in
cases of doubt as to jurisdiction, that court should be allowed to decide, as
indeed it must do, if anyone is to decide; its decisions should be given im-
munity from collateral attack, even though erroneous, unless there has been
"plain usurpation" of authority.'3 If a court decides in favor of its jurisdiction
contrary to a well-defined constitutional guaranty,' 4 or an unambiguous statu-
tory provision,' 5 or a clear rule of law,' 6 then collateral attack should and will
be allowed even though there has been an opportunity to appeal. These
situations are the ones which have been deemed by the courts to present "ex-
ceptional circumstances." But where there is substantial doubt as to the
factual or legal basis for jurisdiction, the decision of a court of general
306 U. S. 19, 59 Sup. Ct. 442, 83 L. Ed. 455 (1939), Chief Justice Hughes also sounded
a warning against the extension of the new doctrine.
11. Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178, 67 Sup. Ct. 1588, 91 L. Ed. 1982 (1946) ; cf.
United States ex rel. Rogalski v. Jackson, 146 F. 2d 251 (C. C. A. 2d 1944). Indicative
of the modern policy of reducing the instances in which habeas corpus may be used to
attack jurisdictional rulings is the statement of Judge A. Hand in Loubriel v. United
States, 9 F. 2d 807, 808 (C. C. A. 2d 1926): "We understand the case of Craig v.
Hecht . . . to have established that the writ does not lie to review an order adjudging
relator in contempt of court. Cases like Ex parte Hudgings . . . are confessedly excep-
tional. We read the last'declaration of the Supreme Court as indicating a disposition
substantially, if not altogether, to eliminate the exception, where a direct review of the
order is possible."
12. RESTATEMiENT, JUDGMENTS § 10, comment b (1942).
13. Carter v. United States, 135 F. 2d 858, 861 (C. C. A. 5th 1943) ; cf. Swan, J., in
Ripperger v. A. C. Allyn & Co., 113 F. 2d 332, 333 (C. C. A. 2d 1940), stating that "a
decision in favor of jurisdiction is res judicata and invulnerable to collateral attack,
even though the ground on which the decision was rested has subsequently been over-
ruled." Cf. United States ex rel. Emanuel v. Jaeger, 117 F. 2d 483 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
14. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178, 67 Sup. Ct. 1588, 91 L. Ed. 1982 (1946)
and cases there cited.
15. United States ex rel. Volpe v. Jordan, 161 F. 2d 390 (C. C. A. 7th 1947) (order
issued by a court in violation of a statute requiring notice of sixty days before proceed-
ings should be held) ; cf. Tennessee v. Taylor, 169 F. 2d 626 (C. C. A. 6th 1948) (order
to show cause issued to district judge for clear violation of a statute and for issuing
injunction against the state).
16. United States ex rel. Stabler v. Watkins, 168 F. 2d 883 (C. C. A. 2d 1948)
(district court assumed jurisdiction upon hearsay evidence only; habeas corpus allowed,
though with doubt, since there had been opportunity for appeal).
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jurisdiction should ordinarily be binding on the parties.' 7 This theory of
delegation of power rationalizes the case law and the "factors" mentioned
by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of Judgments in consider-
ing when collateral attack should be allowed.' 8
The instant case, in its application of res judicata to the ruling on juris-
diction and in its denial of habeas corpus in contempt proceedings, is fully
in accord with the modern authorities.19 The "factors" suggested in the
Restatement of Judgments were present in the case and tended to favor the
result which was reached-that is, there was room for substantial doubt as to
the existence of the jurisdiction of the district court; a question of fact
was involved in the determination; the court was one of general jurisdiction;
and the question of jurisdiction was actually litigated. In this situation, and
in view of the policy of giving support to the rulings of a court which has
been clothed with general jurisdiction, the decision is correct. The case is
significant in its illustration of the questions of policy to be considered and in
showing the trend away from the older authorities.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-APPLICATION OF
"SINGLE PUBLICATION DOCTRINE" TO BOOKS
In 1944 defendant publisher began to market the seventh and final print-
ing of a book which allegedly libeled the plaintiff. During the year preceding
July, 1946, when this suit was brought, defendant sold sixty copies of the
book from stock. Held (4-3), the "single publication rule," previously adopted
as to newspapers and magazines, applies also to books; and plaintiff's cause
of action was barred by the statute of limitations' one year after the final
17. By analogy to the field of agency, if the scope of the agent's authority is clear,
then acts done beyond that scope are unauthorized; but where reasonable doubt exists, a
general agent may have discretion to determine whether he is authorized to do an act,
and even though he is mistaken, his principal may be bound. See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§§ 44, 45 (1933). As to the amount of discretion allowed a general agent as compared
with a special agent, see id. § 3, comment d; § 34, comment b (1933). The president of a
corporation, clothed with authority to conduct a business, will be allowed much more
freedom in interpreting his authority to act in doubtful cases than will a subordinate
officer whose authority is closely defined.
18. § 10, comment b (1942).
19. The dissenting opinion insists that this case goes further than any previous case
has gone in denying habeas corpus in refusing to allow the writ even though the order
violated may not be appealable. The majority, pointing out that there had been ample
opportunity to appeal from other orders in the proceedings, refused to see any distinction
between this case and United States ex rel. Emanuel v. Jaeger, 117 F. 2d 483 (C. C. A.
2d 1941). In that case petitioner was adjudged in civil contempt for violating an order
of a bankruptcy court which probably was without jurisdiction to issue the order. Never-
theless he neglected to take an appeal from a jurisdictional ruling, although he had
opportunity to do so. Habeas corpus was denied. Although the particular order violated
in that case was appealable, while the violated order in the principal case probably was
not, the majority did not think the distinction important enough to allow collateral
attack as a substitute for appeal.
1. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 51, subd. 3.
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printing had been released for wholesale distribution. Gregoire v. G. P. Put-
an's Sons, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (N. Y. 1948) .2
At common law every intentional or negligent sale, delivery, or exhibition
of libelous matter to a third party constituted a separate and distinct publica-
tion; and each publication, if false and unprivileged, would support a separate
action without proof of special damages. 3 Since the person defamed acquired
a new cause of action wherever 4 and whenever a new publication occurred,
the litigation arising from one printing operation might theoretically continue
so long as a single copy of the libel was retained by the publisher and made
available for sale or inspection.5 To avoid this result, a few American courts
have developed what is known as the single-publication rule, holding that
the whole process of distribution for a single issue of a magazine or newspaper
amounts in law to one publication, 6 and that subsequent exhibition of a few
copies of that issue, if properly incidental to the original publication, will not
support a separate action for damages.
In extending this single-publication exception to books the court relies
upon the same arguments which have supported its application to newspapers
2. Reversing 272 App. Div. 591, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (1st Dep't 1947).
3. Staub v. Benthuysen, 36 La. Ann. 467 (1884); Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer,
14 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849) ; GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 418 (3d ed., O'Sul-
livan, 1938); NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 192 (4th ed. 1924); ODERS, LIBEL AND
SLANDER 132, 139, 493 (6th ed. 1929) ; REsTATmENT, TORTS § 578, comment b (1938) ;
see Holden v. American News Co., 52 F: Supp. 24, 32 (E. D. Wash. 1943). But cf.
Murray v. Galbraith, 86 Ark. 50, 109 S. W. 1011 (1908); Fried, Mendelson & Co. v.
Edmund Halstead, Ltd., 203 App. Div. 113, 196 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1st Dep't 1922);
Galligan v. Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n, 25 Misc. 355, 54 N. Y. Supp. 471 .(Sup.
Ct. 1898). There are numerous cases which support this general proposition, but few of
them deal with facts analogous to those in the principal case. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Ex-
PLANATORY NOTES § 1021 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1935).
4. E.g., Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W. D. Wis. 1947);
O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940). On the problem of
venue in libel actions against newspapers see Notes, 37 A. L. R. 908' (1925), 148 A. L. R.
477 (1944).
5. Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill. 1945); Duke
of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849) ; see Wolfson v. Syra-
cuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938), aff'd zere.,
279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. 2d 676 (1939).
6. Cf. United States v. Smith, 173 Fed. 227 (D. Ind. 1909) ; Forman v. Mississippi
Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943) ; Julian v. Kansas City Star Co.,
209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1907).
7. Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640
(4th Dep't 1938), affd inem., 279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. 2d 676 (1939) (leading case) ;
Polchlopek v. American News Co., 73 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mass. 1947);' Hartmann v.
Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E. D. Pa. 1946), aff'd, 166 F. 2d 127 (C. C. A. 3d 1947);
McGlue v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1946); Backus v.
Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660
(S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Means v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S. D. N. Y.
1939); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E. 2d 708 (1st Dist. 1948);
Campbell-Johnston v. Liberty Magazine, Inc., 64 N. Y. S. 2d 659 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
aff'd vien., 270 App. Div. 894, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 581 (1st Dep't 1946) ; Hartmann v. Time,
Inc., 60 N. Y. S. 2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd iner., 271 App. Div. 781, 66 N. Y. S.
2d 151 (1st Dep't 1946) ; see also 59 HARv. L. REv. 136 (1945) ; 26 MINN. L. REV. 131
(1941). Contra: Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill.
1945); cf. O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940); see
Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24, 32 (E. D. Wash. 1943).
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and periodicals. The simultaneous release of thousands of copies of a libelous
book, as of a magazine or newspaper, is factually one assault on the plaintiff's
reputation, it is said, and only one action should arise from it.
8 And, since
this cause of action accrues when the book goes into circulation, 9 the court
feels that the legislative intentioft to outlaw stale claims can only be given
effect by holding that the suit is barred by the statute of limitations one year
later.' 0 The dissenting'judges, however, point out that the statute of limitations
should begin to run when the defendant ceases to wrong the plaintiff, not
when he starts," and they find no basis for assuming that the intent of the
legislature was otherwise.' 2 Although the "dated" quality of a newspaper or
magazine provides assurance that isolated sales long after the date of issue
Are necessarily inconsequential,' 3 relative permanence of form and content
makes it far more difficult to regard sales of a book on any one date as inci-
dental or subordinate to those on any other.' 4 There is no one point at which
the court can logically say that publication is substantially complete, for sales
may continue almost indefinitely. Thus, while recognizing that the single-
publication rule may achieve desirable results in the newspaper and periodical
cases by eliminating certain obviously frivolous suits, the minority contends
that its extension into fields where the actual process of distribution is not
concentrated within a very short period of time is unwarranted and theo-
retically unsound.' 5
Under the holding in the principal case, it would seem that a publisher
may reduce his liability for libelous books wherever economically feasible by
a large initial printing and relatively modest distribution during the first
year of sales. The plaintiff, forced to bring suit before he can ascertain or
prove the full extent of his damages, is nevertheless denied legal protection
against the subsequent release of any copies remaining in stock at the year's
end.' 6 The reasoning of the majority, however, suggests two possible ap-
proaches to such a situation. The court might require that the defendant re-
frain from actively promoting the book in order to avail himself of the
8. 81 N. E. 2d at 49; see 59 HARV. L. REV. 136 (1945).
9. Brian v. Harper, 144 La. 585, 80 So. 885 (1919).
10. 81 N. E. 2d at 48.
11. Id. at 50; cf. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N. E. 251, 259 (1928). The
lower court, holding for plaintiff in the instant case, indicated that he could only recover
damages for those sales which occurred during the year preceding the action. Gregoire
v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 272 App. Div. 591, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 238, 241 (1st Dep't 1947).1 12. 81 N. E. 2d at 49; see Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40,
92 So. 193, 199 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
13. As Judge Desmond, dissenting, expressed it, "nothing is so dead as last week's
newspapers." 81 N. E. 2d at 50; cases cited note 7 supra; 94 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 335 (1946).
14. 81 N. E. 2d at 50 (dissenting opinion) ; see 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 345 (1948).
15. 81 N. E. 2d at 50; see 48 COL. L. Ray. 475, 477 (1948).
16. These consequences have been argued by courts which defend the common-law
rule. Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736, 738 (W. D. Wis. 1947) ; Winrod
v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249, 252 (N. D. Ill. 1945) ; see also 94 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 335 (1946).
[ VOL. 2
RECENT CASES
statute.17 Or, if that approach fails to avoid palpable injustice, the question
of publication might be regarded as one of fact in each individual case, the
court inquiring whether the "bulk," or "substantially all," or some other pro-
portion of the publication took place more than a year before the action. s
Although an increasing number of courts seem to consider that the practical
advantages of the single-publication rule justify its application to newspapers
and magazines, 19 it is unlikely that many states will follow the instant case
by extending the rule to books; for there, where the social interests are more
evenly balanced, most courts may well feel that a change in the substantive
law of libel should be left to the legislature.
REAL PROPERTY-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-MURDER
OF TENANT BY COTENANT
A husband, having been convicted of the murder of his wife, claimed
sole and complete ownership of certain real property which they had held as
tenants by the entirety. Petitioners,as only heirs of the deceased wife, seek to
be declared the equitable owners of ofe-half interest in this realty. iteld,
petition granted; the husband did not become a survivor in contemplation of
law, and such a ruling will not work a forfeiture in contravention of con-
stitution and statute. Grose v. Holland, 211 S. W. 2d 464 (Mo. 1948).
In legal contemplation, where property is conveyed to husband and
wife as "tenants by the entirety" I they take but one estate. Each is the owner
of the entire estate; neither has any separate or joint interest but a unity or
entirety of the whole. If 6ne spouse dies the survivor is said to be sole owner
of the estate, not by reason of having taken anything from the deceased but
because he has had ownership of the whole from the beginning. This explana-
tion is generally accepted in all cases where the death of one party to the
marriage is the result of natural causes. 2 When, however, the death of one
17. See Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d
640, 642 (4th Dep't 1938), aff'd iene., 279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. 2d 676 (1939); see also
38 Micnr. L. REv. 552 (1940). A new printing will provide a fresh cause of action.
Mack, Miller Candle Co. v. Macmillan Co., 239 App. Div. 738, 269 N. Y. Supp. 33 (4th
Dep't 1934), aff'd inem., 266 N. Y. 489, 195 N. E. 167 (1934).
18. 48 COL. L. REv. 475, 477 (1948).
19. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127, 134 (C. C. A. 3d 1947) (discussion of
previous decisions) ; cases cited note 7 supra.
1. "A tenancy by the entirety . . . is essentially a form of joint tenancy, modified
by the common-law theory that husband and wife are one person." 2 TIFFANY, REAL
PRoPE TY § 430 at 217 (3d ed. Jones 1939). See also 4 THoPsoN, REAL PROPERTY
§§ 1803-26 (Perm. ed. 1940). This estate has been destroyed in the greater number
of states through legislation. 4 id. § 1806. But tenancy by the entirety still exists in
Tennessee with all its common-law attributes. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8461 (Williams
1934); Cofinecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. McNeil, 35 F. 2d 675 (C. C. A. 6th 1929);
1 VANDERBLT L. REv. 666 (1948).
2. E.g., Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S. W. 2d 55 (1940); Newson
v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S. W. 2d 384 (1931).
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tenant by the entirety is the result of murder by the other, there arises a
conflict between this principle and the well settled equitable maxim that no
one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong or to acquire
property by his own crime.3 Theory to the contrary, the courts have appre-
ciated that the survivor does, in practical effect, acquire a substantial benefit
by the death of the cotenant,4 and they have sought means whereby this
benefit might be denied the wrongdoer without running counter to the con-
stitutional and statutory provisions that "no conviction can work corruption
of blood or forfeiture of estate." 5
This specific problem has arisen in a number of cases; resulting in vary-
ing solutions. In an early Tennessee case 6 the court ruled that the murderer
took sole and complete ownership of the property,7 while in a later New York
case 8 exactly the opposite result was reached. The more recent case of Barnett
v. Couey 9 held that the murderer could not qualify as a survivor in con-
templation of law, and therefore the property descends as if it had been held
by tenants in common, one-half to each estate. Two cases have made the result
depend upon the court's finding as to which party, slayer or victim, had the
greater life expectancy, but in view of the fact that the matter of life ex-
pectancy involves, of necessity, a large degree of uncertainty, the more equi-
3. BRooar, LEGAL MAXIMS 227 (7th ed. 1900). This general maxim is applied in
many types of situations. It has been expressly applied by some courts, but by no means
all, in cases involving the acquisition of property by murder where the claim is under
the statutes of descent and distribution, under the terms of a will, as survivor under a
joint tenancy, and as beneficiary of an insurance policy. E. g., Perry v. Strawbridge,
209 Mo. .621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908) (intestacy); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393,
79 S. W. 1045 (1903) (insurance and intestacy). See in general, Reppy, The Slzyre's
Bounty-History of the Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rv.
229 (1942) ; Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statuttory
Solution, 49 HAv. L. REv. 715 (1936).
4. As the court says in the instant case: "The husband does acquire an additional
interest through the death of his wife. When her death occurs, he then becomes the
sole owner of the estate. Prior to the wife's death the husband must share the current
profits with his wife. But after her death the husband does not share these profits and
has no possibility of loss of his interest impending over him." 211 S. W. 2d at 467
(1948) ; cf. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478, at 56, 57 (1946).
5. Mo. CoNsT. Art. 2, § 13; Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4858 (1942); TENN. CONST.
Art. I, § 12.
6. Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W. 108 (1906). This
case is somewhat strange in view of Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1045
(1903), which held that a murderer could not inherit from his victim despite the fact
that there was no exception in the statutes of descent and distribution.
7. This position was approved and accepted in Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265,,
88 P. 2d 971 (1939), 24 MINN. L. Ray. 430 (1940); and Hamer v. Kinnan, 16 Pa.
D. & C. 395 (1931). In the Wenker case the court refused to qualify or alter the
common-law precepts, stating that "if any change in the established rules relating to
tenancy by the entirety is to be made with respect to the rights of the surviving spouse,
such change lies within the province of the legislature, and not the courts." 88 P. 2d
at 975. Cf. In re Eckardt's Estate, 184 Misc. 748, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 484, 491 (Surr.
Ct. 1945) (slayer insane).
8. Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918),
16 Micx. L. REV. 561, 27 YALE L. 3. 964.
9. 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. 2d 757 (1930), 11 B. U. L. REv. 129 (1931), 44
HARV. L. REV. 125 (1930), 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 100 (1930) (this case involved the
ownership of a bank deposit belonging to husband and wife as an estate by the entirety).
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table approach would seem to be to resolve all doubt in favor of the innocent
party and allow his heirs to take half of the property immediately and the
other half on the death of the slayer.10
It has been suggested that the more logical solution to this problem lies
in the employment of the constructive trust theory." Such a trust arises
"where a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty
to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it." 12 This procedure is particularly adaptable to
cases involving tenancies by the entirety and has been employed in at least
two cases 13 dealing with such estates. By use of this doctrine the murderer
is not deprived of any property in contravention of the aforementioned con-
stitutional provision, yet at the same time he is not permitted to acquire any
additional interest as a result of his wrongful act.
In the instant case the court has elected to follow the decision announced
in the Barnett case,14 basing its holding upon the idea that the title is vested
in the union created by the marriage with the whole estate being in the legal
survivor, but since the murderer cannot qualify as a survivor in legal con-
templation he never acquired the whole estate and, consequently, the property
descends as if it were held by tenants in common. 15 The court here did not
discuss the application of a constructive trust, apparently deeming it un-
necessary by reason of the fact that petitioner's demand was limited to one-
10. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.-C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927), 5 N. C. L. REv. 373;
Sherman v. Weber, 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933), 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 183.
In the former case the court found that the deceased wife's life expectancy was the
greater, and therefore the murderer was declared to hold the estate as trustee for the
wife's heirs, subject to a life interest in the whole of the property in the slayer. This
life interest was given due to the fact that under the North Carolina law governing
tenancies by the entirety the husband was entitled to the whole of the income and use
during the joint lives of the husband and wife. In the New Jersey case, where the
court found that the husband would have outlived his wife, the ruling was to the effect
that the title vested in the husband as survivor, subject to a trust in favor of the wife's
heirs to the extent of the value of her interest in the net income of the estate for her
normal life expectancy.
The problem has also arisen in connection with joint tenancy cases, where the
courts have also differed in reaching solutions. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div.
87, 279 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dept. 1935) (total property to decedent's estate); Oleff
v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 838 (1935) (total property to murder).
11. AmEs, Can A Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It, in LECTURES
IN LEGAL HisTORY 310, 312 (1913) ; 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 478 (1946);
1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 183a (7th ed. 1929) ; 3 ScorT, TRUSTS § 492 (1939);
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 187-89 (1937).
12. 3 ScOr, TRUSTS 2315 (1939).
13. Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927); Sherman v. Weber,
113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933). See note 10 supra.
14. 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. 2d 757 (1930). It should be noted that the claim in
this case, as in the principal case, was limited to one-half of the estate. The court
intimated that the plaintiff might have been granted greater relief, if the demand had
not been so limited. However, there was no such suggestion advanced in the instant case.
15. In cases of absolute divorce it has been held that the legal fiction of unity of
husband and wife is destroyed and that the estate by the entirety becomes an estate
in common. State ex rel. Roll v. Ellison, 290 Mo. 28, 233 S. W. 1065 (1921) ; Russell
v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 26 S. W. 677 (1894); Whitley v. Meador, 137 Tenn. 163,
192 S. W. 718 (1916).
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half of the estate. It has been forcibly suggested that the general problem can
best be handled by legislation directed toward that end.'
6
REAL PROPERTY-TENANCY FROM YEAR TO YEAR CREATED BY IN-
OPERATIVE LEASE-NOTICE REQUIRED FOR TERMINATION
A lease for ten years reserving an annual rent was signed and delivered,
but because of failure to meet statutory conditions it did not create a ten-
year term. The lessee, however, took possession and paid rent as prescribed
in the inoperative lease. He was given ten-weeks notice that on the date of
termination stated in the lease the tenancy would end. Defendant did not
vacate the premises on that date, and plaintiff brought summary proceedings
to regain possession. Plaintiff contended that the last year of the ten-year
period should be considered as a valid term for one year so that only 30-
days statutory notice was needed to take advantage of the summary remedy.
at the end of the tenth year. Held, that by taking possession and paying his
He also contended that no notice was necessary to terminate the tenancy
yearly rent the defendant became a tenant from year to year. This tenancy
required a six-month notice to terminate, and a statutory three-months notice
as a condition to summary relief. Darling Shops Delaware Corp. v. Baltimore
Center Corp., 60 A. 2d 669 (Md. 1948).
The tenancy in the instant case, under a lease inoperative because it
failed to meet requirements of the recording statute,' became a tenancy from
year to year upon entry and payment of yearly rent; the same result would
have followed if the lease had been inoperative for not meeting the re-
quirements of the Statute of Frauds.2 There is a dearth of authority on the
question of what notice is necessary to terminate a tenancy at the end of the
period stated in the inoperative lease. The English cases in point agree with
the contention of the plaintiff that no notice is necessary. The basis for these
decisions in the early cases is that the invalid lease itself gives the tenant
16. See Wade, supra note 3, recommending a model statute covering all method.t
of acquiring property by killing another. This statute has recently been adopted in two
jurisdictions. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, §§ 3441-56 (Purdon, Supp. 1946); S. D. CODE,
c. 56.05 (1939). Many states have enacted statutes covering restricted aspects of the
problem. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 479, 672 (1942); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8388,
8395 (Williams 1934).
1. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWs, art. 21, § 1 (1939) "No estate . . . above seven
years, shall pass or take effect unless the deed conveying the same shall be executed,
acknowledged, and recorded as herein provided. .."
2. "[W]hat would otherwise be a tenancy at will is ordinarily regarded, by reason of
the payment of a periodic rent, as a periodic tenancy." 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 123
(3d ed., Jones, 1939). Some states hold that a tenancy at will cannot be changed into a
periodic tenancy by payment of periodic rent. Parham v. Kennedy, 60 Ga. App. 52, 2
S. E. 2d 765 (1939) ; Withers v. Larrabee, 49 Me. 570 (1861) ; Lyon v. Cunningham,
136 Mass. 532, 540 (1884) ; Hagan v. Bowers, 182 Minn. 136, 233 N. W. 822 (1930);
Tuttle v. Langley, 68 N. H. 464, 39 Atl. 488 (1896).
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sufficient notice. 3 Before the passage of the Judicature Act (1873), in cases
such as the instant one the courts held there were two estates created: (1)
the tenancy from year to year, created at common law by entry and payment
of yearly rent, and (2) another enforced in equity under the unexecuted
agreement.4 This Act combirled the common law and equity courts,5 with
the result that a person occupying premises under a specifically performable
agreement holds under the same terms in equity as if the lease had been
granted.6 The date of termination, therefore, was controlled by the lease.
The Missouri and New York cases concur with the English decisions, ap-
parently basing their decisions on the reasoning of the earlier English cases.7
The Illinois Court also has reached a decision in agreement with the English
cases, based, however, on statutory construction.8 The Minnesota court,
by dictuno, has refused to recognize the English rule, asserting that the statute
which renders the agreement to lease invalid would be, in effect, disregarded
if the lease controlled the duration of the term.9
The court in the instant case refuses to follow the English rule, and
bases its decision on what it considers to be the logic of the situation. It
reasons that the only logical conclusion is that the tenancy is one from year
to year, and remains such for its entire duration unaffected by the inoperative
lease. Therefore if six-months notice is necessary to terminate the tenancy
during the first years,10 it is equally necessary during the last year of the
period stated in the inoperative lease.
3. Tress v. Savage, 4 E. & B. 36, 119 Eng. Rep. 15 (Q. B. 1854) ; Berrey v. Lindley,
3 Man. & G. 498, 133 Eng. Rep. 1240 (C. P. 1841) ; Doe dern. Tilt v. Stratton, 4 Bing.
466, 130 Eng. Rep. 839 (C. P. 1828) ; cf. Doe dem. Davenish v. Moffatt, 15 Q. B. 257,
117 Eng. Rep. 455 (1850).
4. Walsh v. Lansdale, 21 Ch. D. 9 (1882).
5. 36 & 37 Vicr. c. 66, § 24 (1873).
6. WOODFALL, LANDLORD AND TEN4ANT, c. 4, § 8 (24th ed., Blundell, 1929) ; Walsh v.
Lonsdale, 21 Ch. D. 9 (1882).
7. Vanderhaff v. Lawrence, 201 S. W. 2d 509 (Mo. App. 1947); Ray v. Blackman,
120 Mo. App. 497, 97 S. W. 212 (1906) ; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180, 26 Am. Rep.
567 (1877) ; see Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309, 313, 23 N. E. 298, 7 L. R. A. 69, 16 Am.
St. Rep. 761 (1890).
8. Knecht v. Mitchall, 67 Ill. 86 (1873).
9. Goodwin v. Clover, 91 Minn. 438, 98 N. W. 322, 323, 103 Am. St. Rep. 517
(1904) ; .Johnson v. Albertson, 5.1 Minn. 333, 53 N. W. 642, 643 (1892).
10. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWs, art. 53, § 7 (1939).
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